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GREGORY M. PARKHURST- & JASON F. SHOGREN'"

Evaluating Incentive Mechanisms for
Conserving Habitat
ABSTRACT
Private lands have an important role in the success of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). The current command-andcontrol approach to protecting species on private land has
resulted in disincentives to the landowner, which have decreased
the ability of the ESA to protect many of our endangered and
threatened species. Herein we define and evaluate, from an
economic perspective, eight incentive mechanisms, including the
status quo, for protecting species on private land. We highlight
the strengths and weaknesses and compare and contrast the
incentive mechanisms according to a distinct set of biological,
landowner, and government criteria. Our discussion indicates
that market instruments, such as tradable permits or taxes, which
have been successful in controlling air pollution, are not as
effective for habitat protection. Alternatively, voluntary incentive
mechanisms can be designed such that landowners view habitat
as an asset and are willing participantsin protecting habitat. The
incentive mechanism best suitedfor conserving habitat in a given
region depends on many factors, including government funding,
land values, quantity and quality of habitat, and the region's
developmental pressure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) exemplifies the
struggle between private lands and the public good that arises when the
common good is held in private hands.' The ESA protects species on
public and private lands because they have "ecological, educational,
historical, recreational and scientific value" unaccounted for in the
* Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State
University, Mississippi State, MS 39762, parkhurst@agecon.msstate.edu.
** Stroock Distinguished Professor of Natural Resource Conservation and Management, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 820713965, jramses@uwyo.edu. Thanks to the Institute for Environmental and Natural Resources
and the Stroock Professorship at the University of Wyoming for financial support.
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
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course of "economic growth and development." 2 While 30 years ago this
language seemed harmless enough, today the ESA is the front line in the
conflict between advocates of private property rights and activists
promoting the common good.3 Three factors deepen the debate over
species protection on private lands. First, most land in the United States
is privately owned.4 Second, about half of endangered species rely on
this private land for 80 percent of their habitat.5 Third, some landowners
fear that strict regulatory enforcement of the ESA may deny property
owners valuable use of their land, which rises to the level of a Fifth
Amendment "taking"-private property taken for a public use without
just compensation.6 But the cooperation of private landowners remains
critical for the preservation of endangered species. Habitat conservation
could be increased by rewarding landowners for good stewardship of
habitat. These rewards could be generated at the federal level through
amendment of the ESA, or they could be economic incentives at the state
or local level.
Recognition of the need to provide incentives for private
landowners is not a new concept. Aldo Leopold argued that
conservation "ultimately boil[s] down to reward[ing] the private
landowner who conserves the public interest." 7 Many observers agree.
They believe that endangered species inhabiting private land can be
better protected if. economic incentives encourage landowners to
preserve their property.
Currently, the ESA provides some regulatory incentives for
landowners to cooperate with species conservation policy through
several programs. Habitat Conservation Plans (HCP) allow a landowner
to alter habitat under certain management restrictions.8 Safe Harbor
2. Id. § 1531.
3. The U.S. Congress passed the Act with little or no opposition: 390-12 in the House
and 92-0 in the Senate. See CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE
FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 156-63 (1995).
4. Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned
from the Past QuarterCentury, 28 ENvTL. L. REP. 10701 (1998).
5. Stephan Polasky et al., Endangered Species Conservationon Private Land, 15 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL'Y 66 (1997); see also Gardner M. Brown, Jr. & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the
Endangered Species Act, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1998); Jeffrey A. Michael, Efficient Habitat
Protection with Diverse Landowners and Fragmented Landscapes, 6 ENVTL. SC. & POL'Y 243
(2003).
6. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

See Bean, supranote 4.
See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); see also U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND
INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK (1996), available at http://endangered.
fws.gov/hcp/hcpbook.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander,
The Private Lands Challenge: Integrating Biodiversity Conservation and Private Property, in
7.
8.
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Agreements allow the landowner to improve the habitat quality on his
land without suffering additional uncompensated land use restrictions.9
Candidate Conservation Agreements (CCA) are agreements in which a
landowner limits future land use restrictions by forging an agreement
with the Fish and Wildlife Service to protect a species and its habitat
prior to the listing of the species.' ° The HCP and Safe Harbor policies
provide benefits to landowners only after ESA sanctions have been
levied against their land. CCAs are only applicable to a select grouplandowners that assign a value to protection of a species larger than the
lost economic value resulting from voluntary land use restrictions."
The incentives for landowners to avoid ESA land use regulations
still exist. Landowners may minimize the chances of suffering ESA
restrictions by preventing government biologists from looking for listed
species on private property, destroying habitat for listed species, or
taking listed and potentially listed species. 3 These actions may harm
listed species, destroy or reduce the value of habitat, or increase the costs
of designating habitat and species recovery. Agencies or private parties
can reduce such actions by providing incentives for landowners to
cooperate through compensation for takings, rather than through
controlling land by utilizing ex ante county permits that dictate "proper"
land use or ex post financial penalties for "improper" land use.
A variety of compensation schemes are possible: direct
compensation from the government to owners of land taken; tradable
rights in habitat, under which those who wish to develop land would
buy permits from those who would then not be able to develop;
insurance programs through which landowners are compensated if
endangered species impose costs on them; '" or tax breaks to preserve

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS, PROTECTING

HOMES 92,98 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 1998).
9.

See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENTS FOR PRIVATE LAND-

OWNERS (2002), availableat http://endangered.fws.gov/recovery/harborqa.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2003).
10.

See USFWS, CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS WITH ASSURANCES FOR NON-

FEDERAL PROPERTY OWNERS (2002), availableat http://endangered.fws.gov/listing/cca.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7,2003).
11. See Bean, supranote 4.
12. See Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector
Conservation, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 209 (1998).
13. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000). (defining "take" as to
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct").
14. A good example is the fund created by the not-for-profit organization Defenders of
Wildlife to compensate ranchers for the value of livestock lost due to endangered wolves.
In part, the compensation program has been used to offset opposition to the reintroduction
of endangered wolves. See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, THE BAILEY WILDLIFE FOUNDATION
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large areas of land, rather than to break them up to pay federal estate
taxes. Defenders of Wildlife, for instance, reviewed each state to see what
incentive-based approaches are currently being used to encourage
habitat conservation on private land. 5 Based on a survey of state
incentive programs, they found that about 400 incentive programs
enrolling some 70 million private acres exist in the 50 states-50 percent
of which were created within the last decade. The typical state offers
about four to six conservation incentives, usually in some form of direct
payment and easement with tax relief. About 28 percent of the states
make direct payments, 22 percent provide education and technical
support, 20 percent give tax relief, and 13 percent use property right tolls
like easements and deed restrictions. Market institutions like tradable
permits for species protection were used in about three percent of the
programs. 6 The open question remains: In which situations is each
economic incentive mechanism preferred or is a combination of
mechanisms the best alternative?
This article brings an economic perspective to the review of eight
incentive mechanisms-zoning, impact fees, subsidies, tradable development rights, conservation banking, fee simple acquisition, and conservation easements in the form of either purchased development rights or
donations for tax relief. Examples exist of nearly all these incentive
options and none are simple or straightforward to implement. In our
review of these eight incentive mechanisms we describe the pros and
cons for each mechanism and provide examples. The following section
compares and contrasts each incentive mechanism according to a broad
set of criteria that addresses perceived biological needs, landowner
interests, and regulatory concerns. The criteria respect Leopold's
evolutionary ecological land ethic that reflects the scientific notion that
nature is not a collection of separate parts but an integrated system of
actions, reactions, and feedbacks. 17 This notion focuses on defining the
natural system within the context of human interaction and well-being.
The understanding of the natural system is promoted by working
together to define a set of evaluative criteria that reflect a range of ethical
views. We grade each incentive mechanism on a five point scale, ranging
from very high to very low, for eleven criteria: ability to target land specific
aspects,
permanence,
active
habitat
management, voluntary
WOLF COMPENSATION TRUST, available at http://www.defenders.org/wolfcomp.html (last

visited Oct. 29, 2003).
15. SUSAN GEORGE, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION IN AMERICA: STATE
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION (2002), available at http://www.

biodiversitypartners.org/Incentives/Report/Intro.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
16. Id.
17. See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE (1949).
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recognized,
stewardship
maintained,
privacy
participation,
administrative costs, monitoring and enforcement costs, acquisition
costs, "deadweight losses" associated with private information,"' and risk
of habitat destruction.
II. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
We now explain and describe the eight incentive mechanisms
from an economic perspective. When possible, we provide
above
listed
examples and make comparisons. Each incentive mechanism is
considered in turn.
A. Zoning
As a comparative benchmark to better understand the usefulness
of flexible economic incentive mechanisms, we first discuss zoning, a
standard approach to control land use for questions on endangered
species. 19 Local governments, by exercising their police power of
command and control, influence activities on private property through
zoning ordinances. These ordinances either specify allowable land uses
or enjoin particular activities for specific land regions.2 Governments
have traditionally used zoning to restrict development and other land
uses to protect attributes and characteristics of the environment that the
21
government, acting in the public's interest, deems desirable.
Governments use zoning to guide development toward existing infrastructure and away from environmentally sensitive areas. In Utah,
zoning has also been employed to protect scenic views, open space,
vegetation and tree preservation, and river corridors.n

18. "Deadweight loss" is the economic term for lost value to society due to the
inefficient allocation of resources.
19. When an endangered species is found on private land, the landowner is restricted
from undertaking activities that may harm the species. The land use restrictions sever the
landowner's rights to all land uses that may harm the listed species. Thus, the ESA
restrictions serve to zone the land for species protection. See Andrew J. Miller, Transferable
Development Rights in the Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the
Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 462-63 (1999).
20. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Land Acquisition Planning, pt. 341, in U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL (1996), available at http://policy.fws.gov/ser300.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2003).
21. Miller, supra note 19.
22. UTAH CRITICAL LAND CONSERVATION COMMITTEE, LAND CONSERVATION IN UTAH:
TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, AND INITIATIVES (1997), available at http://www.govemor.state.ut.us/
(last visited Nov. 7,2003) [hereinafter UCLCC].
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B. Impact Fees
Impact fees have become a popular conservation tool over the
last two decades. An impact fee is an ex ante cash payment or in-kind
payment by a developer to a government as a precondition to receive a
development permit. An example of an in-kind payment is when a
developer constructs a new community park. These expenditures are
called exactions and take the form of a cash payment, land donation,
public park, street, or other public good. 23 Regardless of whether the land
use exaction is a cash payment or an in-kind transfer, the developer
assigns a cost to receiving the development permit. This cost is the
impact fee.
Impact fees help assure that developers who create the new
demand for public goods also pay for that demand. 24 Impact fees are
usually paid before the developer obtains his permit, which allows the
new public goods to be created before completion of the development
project. The fee offsets the negative consequences of development to the
surrounding environment and existing infrastructure. For instance,
developers pay an impact fee as a condition for receiving permits for
new projects that would otherwise increase the demand for existing
public goods and services. The revenues received from impact fees
finance the provision of new public goods such as parks, recreational
facilities, open space acquisition, and infrastructure improvements.2
A local government's right to assess an impact fee on new
development rests in its regulatory authority, which is authorized by the
state. This use of police power by local governments has encountered its
share of conflict. Related litigation has resulted in court rulings requiring
a "rational nexus" to exist between the impact fee and the development's
negative impact on the community.2 To be legal, the impact fee must
exhibit a direct relationship between the externalities caused by the
developer's activities and the purpose for which the fees are used.27
Establishing such a cause and effect is a matter of accurately forecasting
future demand for a public good, which is always a challenge due to the
imprecision of economic information. In general, impact fees are paid
23. See ALAN A. ALTSCHULER ET AL., REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF LAND USE ExAcTIONS 3-6 (1993).
24. Jan K. Brueckner, InfrastructureFinancingand Urban Development: The Economics of
Impact Fees, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 383, 385 (1997).
25. See ALTSCHULER ET AL., supranote 23.
26. Id. at 51-54. The "rational nexus" is codified by state statutes. See, e.g., Home
Builders Ass'n of Dayton v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 2000); see
also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
27.

For further discussion, see ALTSCHULER, supra note 23, at 51-54, and Miller, supra

note 19, at 472-86.
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when the developer purchases his permit, are generally not refundable,
and are used for offsite projects that benefit society as a whole. The
municipality determines how, where, and for what the impact fees are to
be spent, but these projects must be reasonably related to the development and be justified by a communities' general plan.28
An alternative to impact fees for development projects is a
performance bond. Performance bonds are required deposits that
developers pay, prior to initiating a project, to insure that predetermined
onsite quality levels are met.9 Performance bonds are not impact fees,
rather they are insurance that in-kind impact fees are satisfied-the
developer builds the community center, public park, etc. Bonds can fund
the acquisition and construction of public goods, satisfying the increase
in demand that results from new development. The bonds, upon
maturity, are typically paid for through the community's general tax
fund, which places the burden of funding on all local residents. The
developer must pay the costs as they arise and oversee the project to
ensure the quality standards are met. Once the regulator determines that
the developer has met the contract conditions, the performance bond is
refunded.'
C. Subsidies
Federal, state, and local regulators as well as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) offer subsidies as financial assistance to
landowners.3 Subsidies can be used to create an incentive that

See ALTSCHULER ET AL., supra note 23, at 51-54.
For a discussion on environmental bonds, see NICK HANLEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85-86 (1997).
30. Id. at 85-87.
31. Examples abound. Landowners are paid a subsidy to conserve the habitat of the
imperiled bog turtle by the North Carolina Herpetological Society. In Texas, Environmental
Defense subsidizes landowners to undertake management strategies that protect
endangered songbirds. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, THE TEXAS HILL COUNTRY ENDANGERED
SONGBIRD SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT (2003), available at http://www.environmental
defense.org/article.cfm?Contentid=142 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). State subsidy programs
28.
29.

are plentiful. See, e.g., EMILY NOAH & YINLAN ZHANG, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE LANDOWNER INCENTIVE PROGRAMS FOR THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/
at
available
(2001),
DIVERSITY

documents/2341_StateIncCompendium%2Epdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). Three examples
are presented also in the text: IDAHO DEP'T OF GAME AND FISH, HABITAT IMPROVEMENT

PROGRAM, available at http://www2.state.id.us/fishgame/hunt/programsinfo/hip/hip.
htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter HIP]; CA. DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME, TIMBER TAX
CREDIT, available at www.dfg.ca.gov/timbertax/ttcp_2.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003);
WASHINGTON STATE SALMON RECOVERY FUNDING BOARD, available at http://www.iac.wa.

gov/srfb/default.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). These programs are frequently implemented in conjunction with federal and local municipal governments.

1100

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

encourages landowners to maintain their land in an undeveloped state
or to mitigate the environmental impact of development by helping the
landowner meet maintenance and restoration costs of environmentally
sensitive areas.32 Subsidies take the form of grants, loans, cash payments,33
or tax allowances that are offered by the appropriate regulating entity.
Subsidy programs are funded by numerous methods, including tax
revenue, lottery funds, and special permits. We now consider four
examples of existing programs to illustrate how subsidies are used in
species protection.
1. Subsidy Example #1. Tax Benefits: California's Timber Tax Credit
The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG)
administers a subsidy program, called the Timber Tax Credit Program
(TTCP).3 The TTCP induces private landowners to undertake
conservation projects that will improve habitat and the probability of
survival of the coho salmon, Chinook salmon and the steelhead trout. 35
The TTCP provides a tax credit of up to $50,000 per year to the private
landowner, upon completion of the approved project. 3' Approved
projects include the restoration of the stream banks or improvements to
the flow of the stream, revegetating the habitat with indigenous plants,
performing upland work to reduce sediment runoff, and improving the
timing and distribution of water returning to the stream.37 Many projects
decrease the speed of the streamflow and cool the temperature of the
water. 8
A landowner who is interested in participating in the TTCP
submits an application listing the applicant's personal information, a
brief description of the proposed project, an estimate of total and
qualified project costs, directions to the proposed project, estimated time
frame, type of fish that will likely benefit from the project, and the tax

32. HANLEY ET AL., supra note 29, at 72. Although subsidies are discussed in terms of
air pollution reduction, one can easily transfer the idea to land uses and find numerous
examples to support the definition.
33. Id.
34. THE RESOURCES AGENCY, CA. DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME, INLAND FISHERIES DIVISION,
TIMBER TAX: FISH (RELATED) INCENTIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE HABITAT (2000), available at
www.dfg.ca.gov/timbertax/ttcp_2.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter CRA].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Salmon eggs are sensitive to both water velocity and water temperature. High
water velocities wash out the gravel beds where salmon spawn. Also, salmon eggs are
damaged as the temperature of the water increases. CITY OF SEATTLE, THE THREATS SALMON
FACE AT EACH STAGE

OF THE LIFE CYCLE,

threats.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).

at http://www.cityofseattle.net/salmon/
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credit recipient's name and identification number.39 Upon receipt of the
application and attachments, the CDFG determines if the proposed
project complies with state and federal law. Projects in compliance are
given an initial onsite inspection, and then can be approved for tax
credit. Tax credits are not allocated until the landowner satisfies the
terms of the proposed project.' ° A final inspection of the project is
conducted within 30 days of completion, and if the project
41 satisfies the
inspection, a tax credit certificate is issued within 90 days.
Tax credits can be up to ten percent of the estimated qualified
costs of the proposed project, which are the costs for labor, materials,
and, in some instances, the rental rate for heavy equipment.42 The costs
must be incurred for purposes that directly increase the survival rate of
salmon and steelhead. Costs associated with the installation of water
pumps, well drilling, permanent roads and buildings, and services
rendered by professional engineers do not qualify.4 3 At the end of the
year, the CDFG sums the estimated qualified costs for all of the
completed approved projects and then divides $500,000 by that sum to
obtain the tax credit percentage, which cannot exceed ten percent." The
estimated qualified costs are then multiplied by the tax credit percentage
and the landowner is issued a tax credit in that amount. This tax credit is
levied against the net tax and, if not completely used in the year issued,
the remaining credit can be applied to tax liabilities in future years. The
timber tax credit is funded by a tax placed on timber sales outside of the
United States and receives approximately $500,000 a year, which is
issued entirely in credits. The costs of administering the program are
covered by a non-dedicated preservation fund.45
2. Subsidy Example #2. Cost Share: Idaho's Habitat Improvement Program
The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) administers the
Habitat Improvement Program (HIP), which is a cost share program that
allocates funds for improvements on both private and public lands in
Idaho. 46 The IDFG recognizes the role private landowners play in
providing habitat for wild birds. The primary objective of HIP is to
encourage private landowners to invest in habitat restoration and

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See CRA, supra note 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See HIP, supra note 31.
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enhancement projects that increase the populations of wild bird species.
The IDFG introduced the HIP because changes in the agricul-tural
production practices negatively affected bird populations. Such changes
48
include new forms of irrigation and increased use of marginal land.
The IDFG attributes the increased attrition of wild birds, in part,
to the farmers' decreased dependence on water canal systems due to
new irrigating technologies, such as sprinkling systems, which make
canals obsolete. 9 As a result, irrigation ditches were lined with concrete
or removed completely, thereby eliminating habitat areas that provided
wild game birds winter homes and nesting areas necessary for
reproduction. The threat to the population of wild birds is also impacted
by farmers who have increased their usage of the land, becoming more
efficient by employing land that was previously idle and often occupied
by wild birds. 4
Landowners interested in participating in the HIP can contact
the local office of the IDFG. Upon notification, the IDFG provides a
habitat biologist who evaluates the land and designs the habitat
restoration project so it benefits upland game and wild birds."' Not all
landowner requests are funded. For those projects that are funded, IDFG
personnel assist the landowner in identifying indigenous vegetation and
provide other technical information concerning species needs and
growing conditions. 2 Accepted projects can encompass revegetating or
creating riparian areas, erecting fences to keep livestock away from wild
game habitat, creating water sources, establishing windbreaks, or
providing wild animals with winter forage. 3 Projects that provide a
benefit to the local wildlife can be implemented on land parcels of all
sizes and may be in conjunction with other government
shapes and
54
programs.
Landowners with accepted projects enter into an agreement with
the IDFG that documents the project plan and specifies the landowner's
requirement to maintain the land, which typically extends for a period
greater than ten years. The IDFG reimburses up to 75 percent of the
landowner's costs when not in conjunction with the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) and 37.5 percent for projects on lands enrolled in
the CRP, with a maximum of $2000 per project.5 The IDFG encourages,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra note 78.
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but does not require, project participants to allow public access to their
land, and landowners can leave the HIP at any time by returning the cost
share funding.6
3. Subsidy Example #3. Cost Share: Washington's Salmon Recovery Funding
Board
The Salmon Recovery Funding Board (SRFB) administers a
program in Washington, the purpose of which is to "support salmon
recovery by funding habitat protection and restoration projects and
related programs and activities that produce sustainable and measurable
benefits for fish and their habitat."5 7 The SRFB consists of ten members.
Five members are appointed by the Governor of the State of Washington,
one of which is a representative of the governor's cabinet. State agency
directors from the Department of Ecology, the Department of Game and
Fish, the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of
Transportation, and the State Conservation Commission make up the
remaining five board members. Only the five appointed board members
are given the right to vote on the procedures and policies associated with
obtaining SRFB funding.8
SRFB funds are made available to private landowners, state
agencies, cities, counties, conservation districts, special purpose districts,
American Indian tribes, and not-for-profit organizations.59 The funds are
obtained through a two-step process. In step one, the landowner or other
interested party submits a proposed project to the local lead entity. The
local entity can be a not-for-profit organization, a local government, or a
tribal government. But the entity must be agreed upon by the cities,
counties, and tribes located within the region the lead entity is to serve.
The requirements the lead entities place upon the applicant vary
from region to region but must include several SRFB mandated criteria.
The minimum costs of a project are $5000, and the SRFB requires that the
applicant provide matching funds of 15 percent of the requisitioned
funds6 These requirements are thought to increase the probability of the
project being completed. Next, the project proposal should specify the

56. See supra note 46.
57. SALMON RECOVERY FUNDING BOARD, REPORT 18, POLICIES AND PROJECT SELECTION
GRANTS MANUAL, SECOND ROUND, 2000 CYCLE, available at http://www.iac.wa.gov/
Documents/Manuals&Forms/Manual_18.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter SRFB

18].
58. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE, ABOUT THE BOARD, at http://
www.iac.wa.gov/srfb/board.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
59. SRFB 18, supra note 57, at 6-7.

60.

Id. at 7.
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exact location of the project, unless the applicant can prove that the
project could be located anywhere within a specified region."
Finally, to be eligible for funding, the project must be one of
eight types: (1) acquisition of land in its entirety or acquisition of a
purchased development rights (PDR) easement;62 (2) improvements to
fish migration up and downstream; (3) screening fish from in-stream
diversions such as dams or headgates or creating a fish by-pass; (4)
improvements to the habitat below the high water mark, including
increasing or decreasing the amount of gravel, rocks, wood, and plants
in the stream bed, along the stream banks, or in the flood plain; (5)
increasing the quality of the riparian area by planting indigenous vegetation, removing evasive plants, fencing the area from livestock, repairing
stream crossings, or improving the quality of the water supply; (6)
improvements to the area outside of the riparian area, or upland, that
decrease the sediment runoff, provide shade for cooling the water, and
affect the time it takes for water to reach the stream; (7) projects that are a
combination of any of the above, in particular those projects that provide
for both the acquisition and restoration of salmon habitat; and (8)
evaluations, studies, and reports that are justifiably needed to improve
the administration of the program.'
After reviewing proposals, step two requires that the lead
entities across the state submit a prioritized list of projects to the SRFB.6'
This list is then scrutinized according to the SRFB funding policies and a
scientific evaluation and assessment of each project is done. Each project
must be accompanied by a standard application, which includes general
information such as the project type, a description of the project,
requested funding, how the requirement for the matching contribution is
to be met, project cost estimates, and a biological assessment that
addresses species information, habitat factors, necessary permits, and
measurement information."
To aid the SRFB in evaluating projects, each project description
on the list must also respond to three threshold questions and six
evaluation questions. The threshold questions address how the project is
to be monitored for effectiveness, the long-term plan for managing and
maintaining the project, and whether the proposed project is already
legally required to be undertaken. The evaluation questions provide the
61. Id. at 9.
62. See discussion on easements, infra section I.G.
63. SRFB 18, supra note 57, at 8-12.
64. Id. at 6.
65. SALMON RECOVERY FUNDING BOARD, FUNDED PROJECTS: POLICIES AND PROJECT
AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.iac.wa.gov/Documents/Manuals&Forms/Manual
7.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter FUNDED PROJECTS).
66. Id. at 3-4.
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board with information concerning the expected benefit of the project to
the survival of salmon, how well the project complements other projects
or programs for salmon recovery, the scientific basis or conservation
plan that supports the project, the cost effectiveness of the project, the
ability of the project coordinator to complete the
6 7 proposed project, and
the reason that the project should be undertaken.
Upon receipt of the applications by the SRFB, a technical panel
of people with experience and expertise in various scientific fields and
employees of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) evaluates the projects." The evaluation
specifies whether the project has a high benefit to salmon, the level of
certainty the project exhibits, and the importance of the project on a
regional scale. Based upon the evaluation, recommendations are
presented to the SRFB in the form of a report, which is used in the
decisionmaking process.69 Once decisions are made, the recipients of
funding deal directly with the SRFB and the Washington State Office of
the Interagency Committee for Outdoor Recreation. These are the two
entities responsible for monitoring and enforcing agreements." The
Salmon Recovery Funding Board is an excellent example of a state
administered cost share subsidy program for protecting an endangered
species.
4. Subsidy Example #4. Conservation Leasing: The USDA's Conservation
Reserve Program
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has its roots in the
dust bowl of the 1930s and the Soil Bank Act of 1956.71 The CRP was
established in 1985 when Congress recognized that eroding cropland
needed protection. Congress passed the Food Security Act of 1985,2 with
the goal to reduce soil erosion by paying farmers to idle highly erodible
lands. 73 The CRP was reauthorized under the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, and the goals of the CRP were extended to
67. Id.
68. See SRFB 18, supranote 57, at 19-20.
69. Id. at 19-27. The Salmon Funding Recovery Board makes the final decision
concerning which projects are funded. Once projects are chosen, the applicant and the
office of the Interagency Committee for Outdoor Recreation enter into a formal project
agreement.
70. Id. at 25. Monitoring the project and providing stewardship are the responsibility
of the applicant, the terms of which are included in the formal project agreement.
71.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM, FARM SERVICE

AGENCY ONLINE, at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/12logocv.htm (last visited Nov.
7, 2003).
72. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat 1354 (enacted Dec. 23, 1985).
73. Id. § 1234(c)(1).
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include environmental concerns and improvements in the quality of
74
water along with the previous goal of reducing soil erosion.
The CRP is administrated by the Commodity Credit Corporation
through the Farm Service Agency, which is part of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA). Farmers are paid a subsidy to place land
previously in commodity production into approved conservation
practices.m Landowners receive a per acre subsidy based on the rental
rate of the land and cost share assistance for planting long-term
approved land cover. 76 The CRP targets lands that provide benefits for
protection.7
enhanced water quality, decreased soil erosion, and wildlife
In 1994, the priority placed on environmental considerations
increased, and the CRP was redirected to enlist land that provided for
greater environmental benefits.78 To accomplish the task of increasing the
enrollment of environmentally sensitive lands, the USDA announced
that owners of less sensitive lands-lands not "devoted to high-priority
conservation practices" or lands over 100 feet away from rivers, streams,
and other bodies of water-were allowed an early release from CRP
contracts.7 Lands that opted out of CRP contracts through the early
release provision were replaced with lands along riverbanks or other
riparian areas, or lands that served as filter strips. In an effort to
encourage landowners possessing the more desirable land to enroll, the
USDA paid extra for environmentally sensitive lands.Y
The passage of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR) confirmed the environmental focus of 1994.81
74. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104
Stat. 3359 (enacted Nov. 28, 1990). See also ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, PROGRESS ON THE
BACK FORTY: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACHES TO ENDANGERED
SPECIES CONSERVATION ON PRIVATE LAND (2000), available at www.environmental

defense.org/documents/150_backforty%2EPDF, (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); Bruce A.
Babcock et al., The Economics of a Public Fund for Environmental Amenities: A Study of CRP
Contracts,78 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 961,961-71 (1996).
75. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FARM SERVICE AGENCY, CONSERVATION RESERVE
PROGRAM, available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/crp.htm (last visited Nov. 7,
2003).
76. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FARM SERVICE AGENCY, FACT SHEET: ELECTRONIC
EDITION, available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html/crp3.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter FSAa].
77. Id.
78. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FARM SERVICE AGENCY, HISTORY OF THE CRP: A NEW
DIRECTION, available at www.fsa.usda.gov?dafp/cepd/12crplogo/history.htm (last visited
Nov. 7,2003).
79. Id. For example, 684,000 acres were released from CRP contracts through the early
release provision.
80. Id. Landowners were paid a bonus incentive payment of ten percent of the rental
rate.
81. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
101 Stat. 888 (1996).
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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 continues to focus
on protecting environmentally sensitive land and authorizes 39.2 million
acres to be maintained in the CRP. 2 As of 1996, nearly 33 million acres
had been taken out of production as a result of CRP enrollment, with an
average annual subsidy of roughly $50 per acre and a total cost of
around $1.8 million per year.'
Under the current program, landowners or land tenants
interested in enrolling their land in the CRP have two options. The first
option is to wait for a periodic CRP sign-up period, in which an
interested landowner or tenant submits an eligible bid to the local Farm
Service Agency (FSA). 4 A bid will be considered for two types of land.
The land is eligible if it has been placed in productive agricultural use for
at least two of the last five years and can legally be used for agricultural
purposes in future years, is pasture land enrolled in the Water Bank
Program, or can support new trees to serve as a windshield or buffer for
a riparian area.8
Upon approval, the applicant submits a bid representing the
necessary subsidy or lease payment required for the applicant to idle his
or her land. This bid cannot exceed a set maximum rental rate to be
considered.6 The applicant also includes a description of restoration
projects that are undertaken if the land is approved for CRP funding. A
cost-share program reimburses 50 percent of the applicant's restoration
costs if approved plants are established on the CRP land. The program
covers up to 75 percent of the restoration costs if the project is to occur
on wetlands. 7
Many more applicants apply for CRP funds than the program
can accept. Decisions on what lands to protect are determined by a
formula called the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), which orders
projects through a point system that assigns points according to six
environmental characteristics and the project's cost.' The higher the
82. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).
See 2002 Farm Bill-Conservation Reserve Program-Long-Term Policy; Interim Rule, 68
Fed. Reg. 24,830, 24,831 (May 8, 2003) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1410).
83. See FSAa, supra note 76. Over 34 million acres of farm land will be enrolled in the
CRP as of October 1, 2003, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, News Room,

Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Sign-up 26--Questions & Answers, available at http://
www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/FullStory.asp?StoryID-1351 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
84. Id.
85. If the land is cropland, it must be considered to be either highly erodible, to be a
wetland, to have significant environmental benefits restored, to be located in a CRP priority
region, to surround uncultivated wetlands, or to be likely to experience scour erosion. See
FSAa, supra note 76.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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point total, the better the chance that the applicant's land receives
funding under the CRP. The primary factors are the benefits provided to
wildlife (in particular existing or restored habitat cover and the
significance of the land for ESA-listed species), water quality, and soil
protection, each having the potential for 100 points as measured on a
sliding scale. 89
The second option for lands to be entered into the CRP is
through the continuous sign-up. 9° This option has the same requirements
as the periodic sign-up, with the extra requirement that the land has to
have a high priority for conservation. To satisfy the high priority
criterion, the land must be suitable as riparian buffers, filter strips, grass
waterways, shelterbelts, field windbreaks, living snow fences, contour
9
grass strips, salt tolerant vegetation, or shallow water areas for wildlife. '
Contracts are signed for ten to fifteen years.92 The applicant still receives
50 percent cost sharing for restoration and can qualify for additional
bonuses of 20 percent and ten percent of the annual rental rate by
and for location in a
providing various lands and land attributes
area." 93
protection
"wellhead
EPA
designated
A criticism of the CRP and other conservation leasing programs
is that the funds used to lease the land could be applied to purchasing
conservation easements, a mechanism that preserves the land in
perpetuity.9' A response to this critical view is that it is questionable
whether one could have secured the same magnitude of land for the
89. Id. Management and maintenance plans are awarded up to 50 points based on the
probability the plans are carried out in the long run. The increased air quality that results
from windbreaks and the resulting decrease in land erosion from wind factors account for
a maximum of 35 points. The location of the land is valued at 25 points at most, with points
increasing the more significant or the higher priority the region is for state and national
conservation efforts. There is no set maximum point allocation for the cost factor, but more
points are earned if no cost share dollars are needed and if the cost per acre is below the
Maximum Acceptable Rental Rate (MARR). The MARR is determined separately for each
county and is based on the soil productivity relative to other counties and the local rental
value of dry land. An applicant's probability of being selected is most influenced by the
planting of the cover mixture scored highest by the EBI, with other significant factors being
sensitive lands and bidding for a lower subsidy. See FSA ONLINE, FACT SHEET, ELECTRONIC
EDITION, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM SIGN-UP 16, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT INDEX

(1997), available at www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html/conservation-reservel6ebi.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter FSAc].
90.

FSA CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM, CONTINUOUS SIGN-UP FOR HIGH PRIORITY

CONSERVATION PRACTICES (1997), availableat http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/
facts/html/contsignup.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter FSAb].
91. Id. at 1
92. Id. at 2; see also FSAa, supra note 76.
93. FSAb, supranote 90, at 2.
94. KEITH WIEBE ET AL., PARTIAL INTERESTS IN LAND: POLICY TOOLS FOR RESOURCE USE
AND CONSERVATION (Econ. Res. Serv./U.S.D.A., AER-744, 1996). For a discussion of Ease-

ments, see section H.G, infra.
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same cost. Conservation leasing also provides the time necessary to
obtain funding, evaluate projects, and apply the government's limited
resources more efficiently. Furthermore, conservation leasing provides
incentives to landowners to provide and improve habitat for endangered
species. Some also argue that the compensation that landowners receive
might change their attitudes toward species-they would now see
endangered species as an asset rather than a liability. 9
Our overview of subsidies for conservation reveals that
governments have a flexible tool to match individual incentives and
desired conservation targets. Tax benefits, cost sharing, or conservation
leases, or some combination can all be used to realign private objectives
with broader social goals. Of course, the money for subsidies must come
from somewhere, usually tax revenue, and could have otherwise been
used for other desirable social objectives (e.g., education, health care). We
now consider other incentive schemes that do not require direct
government funding to operate.
D. Tradable Development Rights with Zoning
Tradable development rights (TDR) programs specify a
predetermined maximum level of development within a specified region
and then distribute development rights to landowners within the
region.9 Landowners who keep their actual development levels below
their allotted development rights level can sell their surplus
development rights to other landowners, or they can use them to offset
development on other properties.97 Development rights need to serve
their purpose as an incentive to change development control to desired
social levels. To meet this goal, total development levels within a given
region are limited such that the development rights are seen as a scarce
resource that is valuable to developers. 98
TDR programs ensure that development occurs on the
properties with the highest development values, but they do not
guarantee that the most environmentally sensitive land is left
undeveloped.9 This unintended result can reduce the net benefits to
society when land has a greater habitat value than development value. If
this land is still developed under the TDRs, the mechanism has
95.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, supranote 74.

96. D. Mills, TransferableDevelopment Rights Markets, 7 J. URBAN EcoN. 63, 63-65 (1980);
James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an
Analysis of Easement Acquisitions 10-11 (Discussion Paper 99-32, Resources for the Future,

1999).
97.
98.
99.

Boyd et al., supra note 96.
HANLEY ET AL., supra note 29, at 88-91.
Boyd et al., supra note 96.
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performed poorly. The most common approach to overcome this
°°
inefficiency is to combine TDRs with zoning.'
Government agencies responsible for land use planning
determine which properties, or zones, within a specified region should be
10
protected for their valuable environmental characteristics and qualities. '
They then restrict development of these properties, and landowners are
provided with development rights to compensate them for the loss of
economic use. These rights then can be sold to developers in the less
restricted properties within the region, where development is more
desirable.
Restricted properties are called sending zones; development
'
properties are called receiving zones. 2 Once sending and receiving zones
are determined, the regulator decides on a formula for transferring the
development rights from one zone to the other. A key feature that
ensures developers purchase TDRs from sending zones is that the
density of development in receiving zones, prior to acquisition of TDRs,
°3
is restricted to less than the demanded density. The price of a TDR is
determined through the open market. To facilitate trading and minimize
transaction costs, regulators can establish a TDR bank or exchange, which
brings together willing buyers and sellers such that each can find mutual
gains through tradei'
Tradable development rights can be complex and administratively cumbersome. Establishing this new market involves technical,
financial, and legal dimensions that must be addressed prior to the
actual trading of development rights. These dimensions include the
following: (1) TDR programs should be established with a "clear legal
authority"-one way is authorization of TDR programs by state law to
minimize costly legal challenges and delays in program implementation;
(2) ensuring that the program meets its goals requires the employment of
expert land planners, lawyers, economists, and scientist to perform
biological assessments, determine the total number and distribution of
TDRs, establish a method by which development rights are transferred,
record such transfers, set the initial zoned development density and
maximum allowable density after TDRs are purchased, and monitor and
enforce all transactions; (3) the TDR program has more effective control
over land uses if authority rests with one agency, and all other methods
for obtaining increases in development density are eliminated-the
100. See Mills, supra note 96, at 66; UCLCC, supra note 22; Miller, supra note 19, at 46569.
101. James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Developing Transferable Rights Programs,6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 372-73 (1989); Miller, supranote 19, at 465-69.
102. Miller, supra note 19, at 465-49; see also Boyd, supra note 96.
103. HANLEY ET AL., supranote 29, at 88-91; Tripp & Dudek, supra note 101, at 373, 377.
104. Tripp & Dudek, supranote 101, at 377.
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developer has to purchase TDRs to increase his or her development
density; (4) the objectives of the land-planning agency should be clear,
concise, and rooted in sound scientific knowledge; (5) the demand for
development within the region should be significant and impose a
significant threat to the region's biodiversity; (6) the regulator should set
the supply of TDRs below the demand to insure that TDRs are seen as a
valuable asset; (7) TDRs should be distributed to landowners in a
method as fair and administratively simple as possible; and, (8) the
regulatory agency should establish a TDR exchange to reduce the friction
within the market, which lowers the barriers of bringing together buyers
and sellers and increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the
program.
TDRs have been used by various states for close to three decades
to protect historical buildings and landmarks, agricultural and ranch
lands, open spaces and view corridors, riparian areas, forests, and other
ecologically sensitive lands. One of the earliest programs was New York
City's Landmark Preservation Law."5 The program was initiated in the
1970s to protect historical landmarks by restricting development of air
above historical buildings.01 7 The law allows the owner to be
compensated for the lost right to develop by transferring the
development rights for that air space to surrounding buildings that are
allowed to build beyond the zoned height restrictions. New York City
also allows development rights to transfer hands via zoning lot mergers
between adjacent landowners.0 8 These landowners can combine their
allowed floor area without joining ownership of the properties, provided
the total floor area between the two buildings does not exceed the zoned
maximum amount of floor area of the two properties. This system allows
a developer to purchase the floor area not in use by an adjacent
landowner and exceed the zoning restriction by that amount.10
Other TDR programs have been designed to protect large
expanses of environmentally sensitive land from the encroachment of
development. One example of a TDR program came into existence in
New Jersey in the early 1980s. In New Jersey, the Pinelands program
105. Id. at 374-77; David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending
the Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to HabitatConservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
405, 433-34 (1996).
106. New York City's Landmark Preservation Law, N.Y. Envir. Conser. Law § 8-0105
(McKinney 2003), was established in 1965, available at http://home.nyc.gov/html/lpc/
html/about/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438
U.S. 104, 114 (1978).

107.

Ank Levinson, Why Oppose TDRs?: Transferable Developmental Rights Can Increase

Overall Development, 27 REGIONAL SCI. & URBAN EcoN. 283,284 (1997).
108. Id. at 285.
109. Id.
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encompasses 1.1 million acres of forested expanse, which is home to
1
several small towns and over 1000 species of plants and animals. The
Pinelands have been targeted for preservation by the state, which used a
TDR program to limit development. Landowners whose land is
restricted from being developed are issued TDRs, the number of which
depends upon the preservation value of that owner's land. The
landowner can then sell the TDRs to other landowners in the Pinelands
region where development is allowed. These landowners must possess
TDRs to develop their land beyond the predetermined housing density.
New Jersey established a TDR exchange to reduce the transaction costs
associated with buyers and sellers locating each other, in which
exchange implies bringing the buyer and the seller together. This
exchange serves as the catalyst for transactions between willing buyers
'
and sellers and determines the market price of TDRs.
Other TDR programs have been authorized by state statute in 22
states, including six in the west."2 Kansas and Washington have passed
legislation that approves the use of TDRs for the purpose of general
zoning.13 In Idaho, TDRs are used to protect "designated historic
properties."1 1 4 Hawaii has approved the use of TDRs for the "protection,
enhancement, preservation, and use of historic properties and burial
"
' In Arizona, TDRs are used to protect the "public health, safety,
sites." 15
welfare" of its citizens. 6 Colorado's TDR programs are to be
general
and
used for the protection of species, species habitat, agricultural and
ranching lands, and open spaces.117
E. Conservation Banking
Developers undertaking a new project are frequently required to
mitigate the adverse effects of their activities. Mitigation can be onsite or
the developer can purchase development credits to satisfy the land use
regulation offsite. Development credits can be purchased as needed or
110. Id. at 284; see Miller, supra note 19, at 465-69.
111. Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus
Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 556-57 (1992); Dana Clark &
David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in
the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 54-55 (1996); Antonio Herman Benjamin &
Charles Weiss, Jr., Economic and Market Incentives as Instruments of Environmental Policy in
Brazil and the United States, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 67,92-94 (1988).
112. Miller, supra note 19, at 468.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.090 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-755(a)(2) (2002);
Miller, supranote 19, at 515-16.
114. IDAHO CODE § 67-4619 (2003); Miller, supra note 19, at 514.
115. HAW. REV. STAT. § 6E-15 (2002); Miller, supranote 19, at 514.
116. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01.A.12 (2003); Miller, supra note 19, at 514.
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-401 (2003); Miller, supranote 19, at 514.
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the developer can purchase excess credits and bank them to fulfill
mitigation requirements of future projects. Developers purchase these
credits from private or publicly owned conservation banks, which
determine the price of credits based on supply and demand.11 The
developer purchases credits only when the cost of mitigation through
credit purchase is less than the costs of alternative approaches to
mitigation, such as onsite mitigation or establishing a separate
conservation bank. If profits are to be made by bank owners, other
conservation bank owners will be attracted into the market, and market
competition will lower the price of the credits." 9
The amount of credits that a conservation bank, also called a
mitigation bank, can sell depends upon the quality and type of habitat and
the number of a specific endangered species supported on a specific
parcel of land.' 20 Bank owners can increase the number of credits at their
disposal by engaging in land management activities that increase either
the quality of habitat, the ability of the land to protect endangered
species, or both. For example, in Georgia the Southlands Mitigation
Bank, owned by International Paper Company (IP), is ideal habitat for
the Red- cockaded woodpecker. 2' These woodpeckers build nests in pine
trees at least 100 years old and require stands at least 30 years old for the
purpose of foraging 2 IP owns 16,000 acres of this habitat in the
Southlands Forest region of Georgia.123 In conjunction with the
Environmental Defense organization, IP developed a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) covering 5300 of the available 16,000 acres.1 24 The HCP
established a baseline of two pairs of woodpeckers and included a land
management plan to meet a goal of increasing the population to 30 pairs
through techniques such as prescribed fire, creating new or restoring
existing nesting cavities, and relocating young woodpeckers to the
region.12n As each new pair of woodpeckers is established in the HCP
area, IP either obtains a permit to offset an incidental take on its own

118. See, e.g., CRA, A CATALOG OF CONSERVATION BANKS IN CALIFORNIA (1996), available
at www.ceres.ca.gov/topic/banking/catalogue-index.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003);
CRA, PRIVATE LAND PROGRAMS AND INCENTIVES (1999), available at http://www.dfg.ca.
gov/habitats/archive/private.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
119. Id.
120.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE,

MITIGATION BANKING AS AN ENDANGERED SPECIES

CONSERVATION TOOL 12-16 (1999), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/
documents/146_mb%2EPDF (last visited Nov. 7,2003) [hereinafter ED1].
121. Id. at APPENDIX 1: CASE STUDIES OF SELECTED ENDANGERED SPECIES MITIGATION
BANKS 16-18 [hereinafter ED2].
122. Id.

123. Id.
124.
125.

Id.; see also U.S.

FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supranote 8.

ED2, supra note 121.
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property or sells the credit from the conservation bank to a third party
26
within a specified region and approved by the FWS.
Credits can also be determined according to a particular type
of habitat. The San Vicente Conservation Bank, for
quantity
and
127
parcel in San Diego County, California. The land
a
320-acre
is
example,
cover is primarily coastal sage scrub and southern mixed chaparral,
habitat for the California gnatcatcher, listed as a threatened species
under the ESA. 28 The habitat is good quality and requires little in the
way of management and maintenance. The San Vicente Conservation
Bank was approved by the California Department of Fish and Game
29
These credits can be
(CDFG) and the FWS and was issued 320 credits
for multi-species
County
Diego
San
within
sold to landowners
species. 3°
threatened
and
endangered
other
mitigation needs and
The Manchester Avenue Conservation Bank (MACB) is a similar
reserve also located in San Diego County and serves as a corridor for the
El Cajon Open Space.1 " The southern maritime chaparral, a unique
habitat, is found on the MACB. Because of the rare quality of this habitat,
the MACB was able to negotiate for credits of one acre for 1.8-credits as
32
compared to the standard ratio of one acre for one credit. The MACB is
owned by a private enterprise that has used many credits to offset its
own development and has sold the remainder to other developers in the
region. 131
Some of the first uses of conservation banks were for wetm
lands.1 The banking scheme closely follows the earlier program of
wetland mitigation banking, which has been used since the 1980s. Until
1995, wetland banks were primarily owned by state highway departments and were established to provide credits to mitigate for adverse
effects to wetlands as regulated by the Clean Water Act (CWA). In
1995, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of
Engineers established guidelines to create and manage wetland

126. Id.
127. Id. at 2-4.
128. For listing information, see U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., at https://ecos.fws.gov/
species-profile/SpeciesProfile?spcode=B08X (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
129. ED2, supra note 121, at 2-4.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4-6. The El Cajon Open Space is a stretch of habitat in the San Diego County
area, which is under intense development pressure.
132. ED2, supra note 121, at 4-6.
133. Id. at 4-6.
134. ED1, supra note 120, at 2-3.
135. Id. at 1-10. The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, was
amended in 1987 as the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7.
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mitigation banks.'- These wetland banks are designed to provide private
landowners certainty regarding assessing land, earning and selling
credits, and defining the present and future obligations and
requirements that a bank owner faces. With these guidelines in place,
landowners can predict the costs of their present and future regulatory
obligations. This serves to reduce the landowners' risk of investing in a
wetlands mitigation
bank and results in landowners supplying
137
conservation.
In 1995, California used conservation banking toward preserving
habitat critical to reduce the risks to endangered species.'3 By 1998, 43
conservation banks were established in California. '39 Drawing on its
experience, California instituted a plan based on 14 principles for
successful implementation of a conservation bank:
* In determining mitigation requirements, priority should be
placed on protecting the habitat and species in the long run. This is best
accomplished off-site and in conjunction with a conservation bank.
* Banks must be established with a legal and enforceable
contract or permit.
* A conservation bank can be of any size as long as it is large
enough to support an ecosystem approach to conservation. The one
exception is when a parcel is one of several parts of a contiguous larger
bank reasonably certain to be completed.
* Fee title sale or a conservation easement insuring the land is
preserved in perpetuity should be recorded on the title of the land in
coordination with the first credit sold.
* Prior to the authorization of a conservation bank, a bank
proposal must be approved. For approval, the bank proposal must
include the assignment of a bank manager, a description of the banks
boundaries and the area for which the credits can be used to offset
development, management and maintenance requirements including
provisions for how those requirements will be achieved, and the
determination of annual reporting responsibilities.
* A plan that details the resources found within the bank, how
those resources are to be managed, and how such management is to be
funded is required prior to the sale of the first credit.

136. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL., GUIDELINES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT &
OPERATION OF WETLAND MITIGATION BANKS IN GEORGIA, available at http://www.sas.

usace.army.mil/bankguid.htm (last visited Nov. 7,2003).
137. ED1, supra note 120, at 1-10.
138.

CRA, A CATALOGUE OF CONSERVATION BANKS IN CALIFORNIA: INNOVATIVE TOOLS

FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1996), available at http://ceres.ca.gov/topic/
banking/bankingreport.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
139. Id.
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* An agency should be designated for the long-term management of the bank.
e A plan should detail the steps to be taken in the event of
unsatisfactory performance by the bank owner. These steps should
ensure the long-term protection of the bank.
* Monitoring and reporting of management activities centered
upon listed species and their habitats should be provided.
* Agencies responsible for ensuring compliance should be
granted an easement for the right of entry to monitor the agreement.
* Bank credits should be determined in accordance with the
initial, or baseline, condition. Given the baseline, credits can be earned
by preserving the land, enhancing the quality or quantity of a habitat or
species on the land, restoring the land to its original condition, or
creating habitat suitable for species preservation where such habitat did
not previously exist.
* The number of bank credits awarded to a bank owner is
determined on a case-by-case basis, and negotiations are between the
bank owner and the appropriate regulatory agencies.
o A transaction for credits between a bank owner in one region
and a developer in another region (out-of-kind mitigation) may be
approved on a case-by-case basis.
* Listing of conservation banks with the California Resource
Agency is required to maintain an inventory of banks throughout the
state.' °
This California process serves two primary purposes: increasing
the certainty about present and future obligations of the bank owner and
ensuring that conservation efforts meet the goals of the regulatory
agency. 141 The process reduces a regulator's monitoring and enforcement
costs by requiring the bank to submit both an annual report and a
contingency plan for bank failure, and by specifying the regulatory
agency's rights to enter the property.
Unlike impact fees, conservation banking compensates landowners for the provision of a public good and does so by allowing the
market to determine the magnitude of the compensation.'2 Conservation
banking differs from TDRs because TDRs are an ex-ante approach in
which the proportion of land to be developed is determined before

140. The formal rules for California's conservation bank program can be found at
http://ceres.ca.gov/wetlands/policies/mitbank.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); see also
new federal guidelines for the establishment of a conservation bank at http://
endangered.fws.gov/policies/conservation-banking.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,2003).
141. ED1, supra note 120, at 2-6.
142. See Impact Fees, supra section 1.B.
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development. 4 3 In contrast, conservation banking is an ex-post
mechanism in which landowners establish conservation banks in
response to developmental pressures. As development increases, the
need to purchase credits increases, and the supply of credits should
increase to meet the higher priced demand. The regulator can determine
the quantity of land to be conserved by controlling the ratio of credits the
developer must purchase to offset the development at the time of
development, which gives the regulator flexibility to meet its
conservation goals.'"
F. Fee Simple Acquisition
Fee simple acquisition is the purchase of land with all of its
inherent property rights. Essentially, a market exists for land in which
buyers and sellers voluntarily agree to a price and make a deal. Sellers
are usually private landowners or organizations; in the context of habitat
conservation, buyers are the government, land trusts, and other not-forprofit organizations."-' They buy land to create public goods such as
wildlife preserves, nature trails, and other park lands."
One example of a fee simple acquisition is Snake Creek Canyon,
located on the east side of the Wasatch Mountains in Utah. A local ski
resort planned to develop the area. Instead, the ski area sold the land to
the Nature Conservancy 47 upon choosing to act in the interests of several
municipalities, private industry, citizen groups, and a state agency.1
These entities pooled their resources to reimburse the Nature
Conservancy for the initial funds to purchase the land. As a result, Snake
Creek Canyon has had its development rights severed. 4 9 The land trust
Utah Open Lands holds the conservation easement. The Utah State
Division of Parks has taken on management of the property. This
acquisition demonstrates how agencies and organizations can work
together to accomplish land use goals.'"

143.
144.

See TDRs, supra section I.D.
EDI, supra note 120, at 13.

145.

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, SuMMARY OF DATA FROM THE 1998 NATIONAL LAND TRUST

CENSUS (2000), available at http://www.lta.org/aboutlta/census.shtml (last visited Nov. 7,
2003).
146. Boyd, supra note 96, at 6; see also UCLCC, supranote 22.
147. The Nature Conservancy is a non-governmental environmental organization with
the objective "to preserve the plants, animals and natural communities that represent the
diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive." See THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY, at http://nature.org/aboutus/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
148. UCLCC, supra note 22.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Another example of cooperation between government agencies
and not-for-profit organizations is the conservation efforts between the
California Coastal Conservancy (CCC) and NGOs."' The CCC offers a
wide array of programs to protect the California coastline and the
valuable resources found there. 1- 2 Since its inception in 1976, the CCC has
helped protect nearly 100,000 acres of wetlands, sand dunes, and
farmlands by working with conservation organizations through the
Nonprofit Organizations Assistance Program (NOAP)"' NOAP provides
funding to nonprofit organizations for the purpose of acquiring land or
interests in land that satisfy CCC objectives. After an organization has
acquired the land with NOAP funds, the ownership and costs of
4
managing the land fall on the shoulders of the nonprofit organization.
Land trusts and other nonprofit organizations use fee simple
acquisition as a tool to protect land in ecologically sensitive regions,
especially focusing on land threatened by urban sprawl. Land trusts
originated over 100 years ago in Massachusetts in 1890.155 Local citizens
sought to protect their landscape from development. Over the last
century, land trusts have been used to protect lands ranging from
56
wetlands to ranches and from shorelines to farms.' Land trusts have
increased from 53 in 1950 to over 1200 today and can be found in all 50
states.57
Purchasing the land in its entirety through donation gives the
land trust more control over land use. The price of this control is the cost
ABOUT THE COASTAL CONSERVANCY

AND

COASTAL CONSERVANCY PROGRAMS (2000), at http://www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov

(last

151.

CALIFORNIA

COASTAL CONSERVANCY,

visited Nov. 7, 2003). The California Coastal Conservancy is a state agency that works in
conjunction with local municipalities, NGOs, and private individuals to protect
environmentally sensitive lands.
152.

CALIFORNIA COASTAL CONSERVANCY, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS, at http://www.

coastalconservancy.ca.gov/Programs/pandp.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
153. Id. NOAP is a state conservation program that provides nonprofit organizations
with working capital and technical assistance to develop approved management
techniques for resource management. See CALIFORNIA COASTAL CONSERVANCY, ABOUT THE
(last visited
CONSERVANCY, at http: //www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov/About/about.htm
Dec. 2, 2003).
154. See supra note 152.
155. Michelle Nijhuis, Acre by Acre: Can Land Trusts Save the West's DisappearingOpen
Space?, 32 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 28, 2000), availableat http://www.hcn.org/servlets/
hcn.Articlearticleid=5572 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
156.

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUSTS: THE FRONT GUARDS OF LAND PROTECTION

(2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter LTAb]; Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land:
Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9, 21 (Julie Ann Gustanski et al.
eds., 2000).
157. See LTAb, supra note 156; Nijhuis, supra note 155. See also Michelle Nijhuis, A LandTrust Toolbox, 32 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2000, available at http://www.hcn.org/
servlets/hcn.Article?articlejid=5573.
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to manage the land, which requires significant staff and resources.'"
Land trusts try to reduce management costs by serving as a broker or
middleman between the landowner and a larger trust or government
agency. Land trusts also avoid management costs by acquiring a
conservation easement, purchased development rights (PDR), or
donated easements, which allows the landowner to remain on the land
and maintain the land according to the terms of the easement." In this
scenario, the land trust is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the
terms of the easement. While enforcement costs have been relatively low
to date, land trusts expect them to escalate as easement-encumbered land
passes from the initial landowner to subsequent landowners. Trusts set
aside funds now to enforce easements in the future. Yet in 2000, more
than 90 percent of easement-encumbered land remained with the
landowner who signed the contract."
Currently in the western United States, about 250 land trusts
exist to protect over a million acres. Land previously held in private
ownership is now owned solely by land trusts or in joint ownership
between private landowners and land trusts. 6' Every western state has at
least one land trust. The number of land trusts in a state is correlated
with the pressure to develop in that state. For example, in 1998,
California had 119 land trusts protecting 536,922 acres and Texas
protected 11,531 acres with 20 land trusts, reflecting varying
development pressures in the two states.' 62
An example of a NOAP agreement is the cooperative effort of
the CCC and the Mendocino Land Trust (MLT), which purchased two
tracts of land bordering the ocean.'6 The first tract, a 74-acre beach
property located in Caspar, California, has a stream that serves as
spawning ground for the endangered Coho salmon.TM The second tract is
Navarro Point, a 55-acre expanse of coast and open headlands. The
combined purchase price for the two properties was $2.9 million.9's The
long-term management of the Navarro Point property is estimated to
cost $300,000. '66The Caspar Beach property, which allows for public

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Nijhuis, supra note 155.
Conservation Easements, infra section ll.G.
Nijhuis, supra note 155.
Id.
Gustanski, supra note 156, at 19.
163. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST SUCCESS STORIES--PACIFIC REGION (2000) (on
file with author) [hereinafter LTAa].
164. CAL. DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME, CAL. CODE OF REG., tit. 14, § 670.5, STATE AND
FEDERALLY LISTED ENDANGERED AND THREATENED ANIMALS OF CALIFORNIA (2000), at http:

//www.dfg.ca.gov/whdab/pdfs/TEAnimals.pdf
165. Id. See also LTAa, supra note 163.
166. LTAa, supra note 163.

[hereinafter CDFG].

1120

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

access, has estimated annual maintenance costs of $12,000.167 MLT is
currently raising money for the management of Navarro Point and
working out an agreement to transfer ownership and maintenance of the
Caspar property to the California State Parks Department.98
G. Conservation Easements
Ownership of land provides the landowner certain rights
regarding how the land can be used, which include the right to exclude
others from using the land, the right to develop the land, the right to
produce commodities, and the right to employ other legal rent-seeking
activities. A conventional easement is a legal instrument that serves to
transfer specific rights in the land from the landowner to another
entity. 69A conservation easement serves the same purpose, except that
species and habitat protection is the explicit goal.' 70
A conventional easement is generally negotiated between
adjacent landowners where both landowners benefit from the
agreement. Ronald Coase implied the concept of an easement in his
seminal article The Problems of Social Cost. 7' He addressed how
bargaining over the resource in question rather than government
taxation could remove the social cost caused by a rancher's cattle
trampling a neighbor's crops on their way to a watering hole. Coase
argued that the rancher and the farmer could both increase their wellbeing by establishing an easement, assuming the farmer holds the
property rights and transaction costs are low."2 If the farmer would
accept a payment from the rancher in exchange for the easement, the
rancher's cattle could then cross the farmers land within the terms of the
contract. 73
Conventional easements are typically affirmative and appurtenant. Affirmative means that the easement holder is given the right to
conduct specified activities, such as using the property as a right-ofway. 74 Appurtenant means that the benefits provided by the easement
belong to and are typically realized by a neighboring landowner"2 Such

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. WIEBE, supra note 94, at 4.
170. Id. at 5.
171. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1960), reprinted in
EcONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 109, 109-38 (Robert Dorfman &
Nancy Dorfman eds., 1993).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. WIEBE, supra note 94, at 4.
175. Id.
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easements have been used to transfer partial interests in land and have
been recognized as legitimate for thousands of years.' 76
Like conventional easements, a conservation easement severs
some of the interests in the land and transfers those interests to another
party. In contrast to a conventional easement, a conservation easement
tends to be negative and in gross. Here negative means that rather than
allowing the holder of the easement to engage in specified activities, the
holder of the easement can restrict the landowner from engaging in
specified activities.'7 In gross means the easement holder can be
someone other than an adjacent landowner.1 78 A conservation easement
prohibits the landowner from specified uses on his or her land.79
Conservation easements are voluntary contracts between a
landowner and the government agency or not-for-profit organization
initiating the measure. Conservation easement contracts are negotiated
on a property-by-property basis and can be tailored to satisfy individual
landowner requirements while maintaining conservation objectives."
These contracts typically include a description of the conservation goals
for the property, an initial appraisal of the land, acceptable land uses and
restrictions on land uses, the landowner's management responsibilities, a
statement of the conservator's right to access the land, proof of
unencumbered ownership, legal requirements in the event of a contract
breach, provisions regarding present and future liabilities, and the
landowner's requirement of notification when the property is sold."
Contracts also
specify duration of the easement and compensation to the
82
landowner.

Consider a rancher whose land borders Yellowstone Park in
Montana and offers excellent habitat for the grizzly bear, a species listed
as threatened by the FWS."n Suppose this rancher is approached by a
nonprofit conservation organization and the terms of a conservation
easement are negotiated.'s A contract between the rancher and the notfor-profit organization is created in which the rancher agrees to refrain
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Boyd, supra note 96, at 16.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 7.
183. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BEAR, GRIZZLY, at https://ecos.fws.gov/speciesprofile/SpeciesProfile?spcode=A001 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
184. In Montana, only state and federal agencies or not-for-profit organizations that are
qualified by the I.R.S. are allowed to own a conservation easement. See Todd Mayo, A
Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in PROTECTING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 26, 35 (Julie Ann Gustanski et al.
eds., 2000).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
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from developing any portion of his land and further agrees to limit or
discontinue grazing on portions of the land deemed to be valuable
grizzly habitat and sensitive to grazing. In return, the rancher receives
payment for his conservation efforts. The land conserved increases the
likelihood of the species' recovery and eventual delisting. The
conservation easement provides societal benefits from the conservation
of the land. Possession of the development rights does not give the
organization the right to develop the land; in contrast, it gives the holder
the right to, and the obligation of, restricting development of the land.1 n
In general, conservation easements are classified into two broad
categories-purchased development rights (PDR) easements and
donated easements.'" The type of sellers, the type of buyers, the mode of
compensation, and the duration of87 the contract characterize the
difference between the two easements.
1. PDR Easements
A PDR easement is a conservation mechanism in which the
landowner sells the conservation-incompatible uses of the land for a
specified period of time for a cash payment, usually at the fair market
value of the easement.1m The fair market value is the difference between
the easement-free value and the easement-encumbered value of the
property. 89 Determining just compensation is complicated because no
easement market exists because of the classic public goods problem:
markets fail to provide an efficient level of a public good because not all
the benefits and costs of ownership accrue to the buyer. Buyers therefore
have incentive to free ride off the actions of other buyers, such that the
market starts to unravel.' 9 Additionally, the value of the land
unencumbered is uncertain and likely to change in conjunction with
changing developmental pressures.191
PDR easements are typically entered into by profit-maximizing
landowners who require full compensation for their foregone
opportunity, equal to the land's development value. 92 The purchaser of a
185. Boyd, supra note 96, at 7; see also WIEBE, supranote 94, at 4.
186. Boyd, supra note 96, at 6-9.
187. Id.; see also Nijhuis, supra note 155, at 12; Land Trust Alliance, American Farm and
Ranch Protection Act, available at http://www.lta.org/publicpolicy/tax97.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2004).
188. Boyd, supra note 96, at 6-9.
189. Id. at 27; see also WIEBE, supra note 94, at 6. Wiebe refers to the difference between
the restricted and unrestricted value of the land as the option value, in which the
landowner sells the option to develop his or her land to conservation-unfriendly land uses.
190. HANLEY ET AL., supra note 29, at 42-44.
191. Boyd, supra note 96, at 27-29; see also WIEBE, supra note 94, at 3641.
192. Nijhuis, supra note 155, at 12.

Fall 20031

INCENTIVE MECHANISMS

1123

PDR easement is often a government agency, which generally has a
larger budget than most not-for-profit organizations and is therefore
better able to finance the purchase of the easement. The payment for a
PDR easement is typically a one-time lump sum payment and PDR
easements can be purchased for limited time periods or in perpetuity.'
2. Donated Easements
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) offers tax incentives to
landowners who donate in perpetuity the development interests in their
land for conservation purposes to a qualified not-for-profit organization
or government agency. 94 The IRS requires the donated easement be for
land that provides society with a valued public good, and the recipient
must be pre-approved by the IRS as 19tax-exempt
and eligible to receive
5
donations used for tax considerations.
A donated easement is based on a tax incentive, which typically
appeals to landowners who value the preservation of land and are
willing to be compensated at less than fair market value for the
easement.'1 Tax incentives can take the form of a deduction in income
taxes, a reduction in the base value for estate or gift taxes, and, if the
conservation easement meets 97 certain requirements, an additional
reduction in the estate tax base.
Qualifying lands must satisfy one of the following conservation
purposes: (1) provide education or outdoor recreation to society, (2)
provide protection to species by conserving their natural habitat or
ecosystem, (3) provide society a scenic vista by preserving open spaces,
or (4) provide for the protection of historically significant lands and
buildings. Easements are donated to an organization established for
conservation purposes and qualified to monitor and enforce the terms of

193. AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, PURCHASE OF AGRICULTURAL EASEMENTS FACT
SHEET, availableat http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/tas/tafs-pace.html (last visited Nov.
7,2003) (providing an example of an agricultural conservation easement program).
194. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 526,
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 6 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p526.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); PUB. NO. 561: DETERMINING THE VALUE OF
DONATED PROPERTY 7 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p561.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003). See generally STEPHEN SMALL, PRESERVING FAMILY LANDS: BOOK
1, ESSENTIAL TAX STRATEGIES FOR THE LANDOWNER i-117 (1998). See also WIEBE, supra note

94, at 12.
195. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 526, supranote 194, at 2.
196. Nijhuis, supranote 155, at 13.
197. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, TAX BENEFITS FOR CONSERVATION, at http://www.lta.org/
publicpolicy/taxbenefits.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (listing tax benefits for land
contributions).
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the easement. The easement can then only be resold or transferred to a
similar organization or agency."'
The deductions provided by a conservation easement to the
heirs of an estate are two-fold. First, the value of the estate is reduced by
the fair market value of the easement.'9 Second, the land may qualify for
an additional 40 percent reduction to the tax base of the estate up to the
exclusion limit. 200 To qualify for the additional tax relief, the conservation
easement must reduce the value of the land by at least 30 percent. The
additional tax relief is less for smaller percentage reductions in estate
value. 2 ' The exclusion limit for deaths occurring in the year 2000 is
$300,000 and increases to $500,000 for the year 2002 and thereafter. 2°2 To
qualify for the additional tax deduction for high conservation value, the
land must satisfy certain ownership require-ments and must be within
25 miles of an Office of Management and Budget designated
metropolitan statistical area or a federal wilderness area, or lie within ten
miles of an urban national forest.2' Of course, the ongoing debate in
Congress over tax policy could change these conditions over the next
few years.
These underlying incentives can be the difference between an
estate being maintained in one contiguous area or being broken up and
sold to meet estate tax liability. Estates that are valued at less than
$675,000 have an estate tax liability of zero. For example, suppose an
estate is valued at $1,500,000 and a landowner or heir donates a
conservation easement valued at $500,000 to a qualified not-for-profit
organization. The estate also benefits from a $400,000 deduction due to
the high conservation quality of the land. The estate tax would be levied
on an estate valued at $600,000, and the heirs would escape any estate
tax liability as a result of the donation. 204

198. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 561, supra note 194; see also Dave Hunt,
Conservation Easements and Donationsfor Tax Deductions HABITAT ExTENSION BULL. No. 14
(Wyoming Game & Fish Dept., Jan. 1994).
199. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The exclusion limit is the size of the estate excluded from estate taxes. The estate
tax benefits can be used to reduce the estate's value down to the exclusion limit, so that no
estate taxes are incurred.
203. See Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat 788 (1997), as
amended by the Internal Revenue Service Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat.
685 (1998); see also Stephen Small, An Obscure Tax Code Provision Takes Private Land
Protection into the Twenty-First Century, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 55 (Julie Ann Gustanski et al. eds., 2000).
204. SMALL, supra note 194; see also LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AMERICAN FARM AND
RANCH PROTECTION ACT (2000), at http://www.ta.org/publicpolicy/tax97.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter LTAc].
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Donated easements may also reduce a landowner's income tax
liability. A landowner who donates a conservation easement to a
qualified agency can deduct the entire value of the easement from his
income tax provided it does not exceed 30 percent of his adjusted gross
income.2u If the easement value exceeds this 30-percent threshold, the
landowner can deduct 30 percent of his adjusted gross income for up to
six years or until he has exhausted the easement value. The value of the
easement is measured as the difference in the property value with and
without the easement.2°
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS: COMPARE AND CONTRAST
A U.S. Senator once said in private conversation that "if we pay
landowners to grow endangered species, we will have more than we
know what to do with. "27 The question is how to do this in the most costeffective manner such that biological needs are met, landowner concerns
are addressed, and government budgets are solvent. In this section we
evaluate each economic incentive described in part II based on three
broad criteria: (1) biological needs of the land and species, (2) landowner
interests, and (3) government or regulatory concerns. 208 The incentive
mechanisms are rated on a five-point scale-very high, high, medium,
low, or very low, according to how well the incentive mechanism
satisfies each criterion. Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the
mechanisms and criteria. 209

205. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 526, supra note 194, at 8-10.
206. Id.
207. This quote comes from personal communication with the authors.
208. We created these three broad criteria to evaluate economic incentives to better
understand how each mechanism relates to satisfying the basic elements of collective
regulation for the environment: biological needs, political realities, and regulatory limits.
209. After much discussion, we concluded that this type of structure is the best for our
purposes in this paper for two main reasons. First, the table is "general," whereas a
numerical ranking system will likely depend on the species, the land type, and the
landowner. Second, a generic numerical ranking might suggest one mechanism dominates
when two or three mechanisms in combination might be best. Future work could involve a
specific case study on a species at risk, e.g., protection of the Moapa dace that lives in the
warm springs at the headwaters of the Muddy River, which lies northeast of Las Vegas,
and work through the table adding a 1-5 numerical ranking to see if any mechanism
dominates.
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Table 1. Evaluative Criteria & Incentive Mechanisms
Fee
Donated
PDR
Conservatio Simple
egulatio mpac
Fee
ubsid DRs banking Purchase Easemen Easemenl
Zoning
CRITERIA
Biological
Odds of
Coordinated
Retired Acres:
LargerHabitat
Reserves
Permanency

VH

L

M

VH

VH

M

M

L

L-M

VL

VL

VH

L-M

L-M-H

L-M-H

VL

VL

VH

L-MH
VL

VH

VH

M-H

M-H

VL

L

VH

VL

VH

VH

VH

VH

VH

L-M-H

H

H

VH
VL
L

L-M-H

L-M-H

VL

VL

M

VL

VH

VL

L-M-H

L-M-H

L-M

M

H-VH

H

VH

L-M

H

L-M

Monitoring &
Enforcement
Costs
Acquisition
Costs
Information
Rents (DWL)

H-VH

H-VH

M

H

L-M

L

H-VH

H-VH

VL

VL

H

VL

VL

VH

M-H

L-M

VL

VL

H-VH

VL

VL

H-VH

M-H

M

Risk of Habitat
Destruction

VH

VH

VL

HVH

VL

VL-L

VL

VL

Active Habitat
Management
Landowner
Voluntary
Participation
Privacy
Maintained
Stewardship
Recognized
Government
Administration
Costs

Matrix of Economic Incentive Mechanisms and Evaluation Criteria :VH-very high; Hhigh; M-mediun; L-low; VL-very low

A. Biological Needs
Based on our reading of the extant literature and our ongoing
experience with policy makers, landowners, and scientists, we now
consider three policy-orientated biological needs aimed at retiring and
enhancing habitat on private property that shelters endangered
species.'21 The first criteria is the ability for a mechanism to target specific

210. Retiring habitat refers to land being used only for habitat. It is retired from other
productive land uses.
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characteristics of the land-whether it be creating one large preserve
with minimal edge, preserving a specific plant or animal species, or
preserving several small areas for meta-population manage-ment. The
second criterion is the likelihood of permanent habitat protection. The
third criterion is the ability of the mechanism to imple-ment active
habitat management techniques. We follow John Terborgh's observation
that "logic calls for a strategy that minimizes extinctions, and this is best
accomplished with large preserves."'2 Biologists seem to agree with the
view that habitat requirements are species specific, and species that are
more land sensitive need larger habitat remnants for survival.2
Fragmentation increases the risk to species when it alters the
microclimate of the habitat and when each fragment remains isolated.
Following Rodney Smith and Jason Shogren,1 1 assume biologists have
identified and targeted the private land most suitable to guarantee the
safe minimum standard maximum viable population, or minimum
acceptable probability of survival.1 4 We use these three characteristics as
proxies for the biological needs given these land use decisions.
1. Biological Needs: Species-Specific Requirements
Habitat and foraging requirements differ across species. Species
may require large contiguous habitat reserves or habitat linkages
between reserves or both. Species may also require specific shrubs, trees,
or habitat types for nesting. 215 Unfortunately, for most listed species,
habitat destruction has reduced the amount of remaining habitat to a
level below that necessary for the species' survival. In most cases, the
remaining habitat is fragmented into several smaller reserves. And
although some species thrive on the edge between habitats, biologists
believe most endangered species do not. 6 New evidence has overtaken
the Leopold "law of interspersion"-more edge, more population

211. John Terborgh, Island Biogeography and Conservation: Strategy and Limitations, 193
Sci. 1027, 1029 (1976). Dr. Terborgh is the James B. Duke professor of environmental science
and biology at Duke University.
212. See, e.g., Denis Saunders et al., Biological Consequences of Ecosystem Fragmentation:A
Review, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 18,18-32 (1991).
213. Rodney Smith & Jason Shogren, Voluntary Incentive Design for Endangered Species
Protection, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 169, 169-72 (2002).
214. Id.
215. Saunders et al., supra note 212, at 19-25; E. Willis, Conservation, Subdivision of
Reserves, and the Anti-dismemberment Hypothesis, 42 OIIKOS 396 (1984); M. Gilpin & J.
Diamond, Subdivision of Nature Reserves and the Maintenanceof Species Diversity, 285 NATURE
567 (1980); R. Whitcomb et al., Island Biogeographyand Conservation: Strategy and Limitations,
193 Sci. 1030, 1030-32 (1976); A. Higgs & M. Usher, Should Nature Reserves Be Large or Small,
285 NATURE 568 (1980).
216. Saunders et al., supra note 212, at 19-25.
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density-with the proposition that edge effects cause extinction. 17 Edge
effects arise from nest paratism and the penetration of light and wind
into the habitat. Species move away from the edge and further into a
forest causing a reduction in total core habitat area and lower population
persistence.21 8
Disease is another large threat to the survival of endangered and
threatened species. For example, the black-footed ferret is affected by
canine distemper and sylvatic plague, among other diseases. 219 The blacktailed prairie dog, the primary diet of the black-footed ferret, is also
susceptible to canine distemper.20 If infected by these diseases, an entire
colony can be wiped out.21 For species that are sensitive to disease, the
biological goal would include preserving several isolated populations as
well as meeting a minimum population size or habitat core area.
Management of several meta-populations would be necessary to meet
some minimum probability of survival because, as the number of
individual populations is reduced, the probability of an epidemic wiping
out the species is increased. m
Another biological concern that must be addressed when
planning and designing habitat reserves is preserving lands that possess
key habitat characteristics that the listed species need for survival. For
example, each red cockaded woodpecker requires roughly 100 acres of
open pine stands for foraging and roosting. For foraging, pines need to
be at least 30 years old, while roosting cavities are typically dug into
older pines (over 60 years old) infected by red-heart disease. m When
designing mechanisms for protecting species, each species has its own
set of habitat and dietary needs that must be considered in conjunction
with the minimal size of the habitat reserve.
An effective conservation strategy must address these biological
needs and, in doing so, should view the landscape as a whole. For most
listed species, targeting species-specific habitat requirements and coordinating landowner conservation efforts to create larger preserves
increases the species' probability of survival. Coordinating conservation
217. See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT (1933). See also L. Scott Mills,
Edge Effects and Isolation: Red-Backed Voles on ForestRemnants, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 395
(1995).
218. See, e.g., Peter D. Vickery et al., Effects of HabitatArea on the Distributionof Grassland
Birds in Maine, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1087 (1994).
219.

See

BLACK-FOOTED FERRET RECOVERY PROGRAM, BLACK-FOOTED FERRET: FERRET

FACTS: THREATS TO THE FERRET, available at http://www.blackfootedferret.org/ (last visited
Nov. 7,2003).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.; see also Saunders et al., supra note 212. A meta-population is composed of
several smaller populations or colonies of a species.
223. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 20.
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across landowners, so that two or more fragmented habitats of
insufficient size are connected to make one large reserve, may also have
the added benefit that, in meeting the ESA objective of conserving
imperiled species "to the extent practicable," less total acres are required.
By coordinating conservation into larger reserves, especially if the edgeto-core ratio is minimized, the minimum acceptable probability of
survival for a listed species is met with fewer total acres than if
conservation is fragmented.
Zoning, TDR, and conservation banks have a very high potential
for targeting species-specific habitat needs and coordinating conservation into larger habitat reserves. The regulator, when employing either a
zoning or TDR policy, restricts the land desired for conservation from
4
being used for any purpose other than conservation." The regulator can
target specific land and land attributes, which include the edge-to-core
ratio of the habitat reserve.
Unlike the command and control approaches of zoning and
banking is effective at preserving specific land
conservation
TDR,
one single large habitat reserve, because the bank
creating
attributes and
with incentives to create the most effective
presented
owner is
The number of credits the conservation bank
reserves
conservation
is dependent on the quality of the habitat of the
acre
per
earn
owner can
of the species, and the number of listed
rarity
the
conservation bank,
6
To maximize the number of credits
support2
can
species that the bank
has an incentive to create a
owner
bank
the
available for sale,
needs by creating
species-specific
the
meets
best
conservation bank that
management
habitat
employing
area,
one large contiguous habitat
banks
conservation
new
or
locating
techniques like prescribed burnings,
habitat.22
next to existing
Subsidies, fee simple acquisition, and PDR easements are all
voluntary incentive mechanisms and, as a result, the regulator's ability to
target specific land for conservation is reduced.' Some landowners may
not want to participate in the program at any price, while other
landowners may value their land at a higher price than the regulator is
willing to pay. Landowners unwilling to participate may limit the
effectiveness of these policy instruments at designing one large habitat
reserve.

224.
225.
226.
227.

Recall the discussion in sections II.A and H.D.
Recall the discussion in section II.5.E.
ED1, supra note 120.
See COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, MULTIPLE SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN (2000), available

at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/mscp/mscp-home.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); see also
ED1, supra note 120.
228. Recall the discussion in sections lI.C, II.F, and II.G.1.
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The benefit of a subsidy program, though limited by the number
of willing participants, is that the program can be designed to protect
specific attributes of the environment. In general, the process to
participate in the program includes an application, a conservation plan,
and an initial and final inspection.229 For many subsidy programs,
landowners are not paid until the final inspection has been conducted
and approved, providing the government agency considerable project
discretion and oversight. Government agencies are able to choose the
projects that satisfy some pre-designed evaluation process and pick those
projects that meet the goals of the program at the least cost. Examples are
the SRFB's two-stage technical evaluation process and the CRP's
Environmental Benefits Index.m
Impact fees and donated easements are mechanisms providing
the regulator with the least control over the land set aside for habitat
protection. When an impact fee policy is used, the land that remains
undeveloped (or conserved) is the land with a development value less
than the impact fee. 2 It is unlikely that the conserved land is the land
with the highest quality habitat or that the configuration of the habitat
reserve would be such that edge effects are minimized.
The problem with donated easements is that they only appeal to
landowners that have a high conservation value because typically
landowners are not fully compensated for the lost land productivity. It is
possible, albeit unlikely, that all landowners that find donated easements
appealing live in the same area and their properties border each other in
a manner that creates the largest possible core. It is more likely that
habitat reserves would remain fragmented.
2. Biological Needs: Permanency
Land worth conserving today because of rich habitat and
biodiversity is likely to be land worth preserving indefinitely. This
concept holds true if the regulator is seeking to meet the Endangered
Species Act objective at least cost-where the minimum acceptable
probability of survival is just satisfied. 3" A loss of a relatively small
portion of the conserved land could send a delisted species back to an
229. See examples in Subsidies, supra section I.C.
230. See FSAb, supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also SRFB 18, supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
231. Recall the discussion in sections II.B and II.G.2.
232. A landowner will only pay the impact fee if the net return, developed value less
the impact fee, is positive. Because the impact fee is required for the land to be developed,
if the impact fee is not paid, the land will not be developed.
233. If the regulator only conserves enough land to meet the goal of the ESA, whether
that is an acceptable population level or minimum probability of survival, any loss of
habitat will result in failure to meet the goal.
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imperiled status. Three potential pitfalls for permanency in conservation
are short-term contracts, because successive negotiations may not be
successful; oversight and future land uses subject to political whims; and
contracts subject to conflict, future litigation, and possible reductions in
conservation requirements.2
Conservation banking is the incentive mechanism best able to
guarantee the land remains conserved in perpetuity. Conservation
banks, prior to approval by the regulator and sale of the first bankable
credit, are required to establish a conservator for the bank, fund the
management and maintenance of the bank in perpetuity, and, if the
conservation bank falls short of its conservation goal, specify the
corrective actions that are to be taken. 235
PDR easements, donated easements, and TDRs with zoning are
designed to conserve land in perpetuity but may be shrouded in
uncertainty. A TDR with zoning may be susceptible to political pressure,
especially if zoning is the only method to ensure development does not
occur in sending zones.- Since zoning is not a permanent feature of
land, the zoned uses can change when political power changes. Some
TDR programs require that landowners place a conservation easement
it.237
on the title of the land, permanently severing the rights to develop
Conservation easements, however, are not a panacea. The easement contract specifies conservation requirements to be permanent. But
easements are susceptible to subsequent landowners scrutinizing the
easement in search of loopholes by which to increase personal returns to
the land. To appease new landowners, the agreements may have to be
renegotiated or the conservator may have to force the landowner to
comply by taking legal action. It is likely that the landowners gain more
flexibility in using the land, meanwhile reducing the conservation
commitments of the easement. Over time, conservation commitments
may be significantly reduced, rendering the conservation commitment
insufficient to achieve its initial goal, much the same as if the land had
been developed completely.'
Fee simple acquisition and zoning are less likely than easements
to conserve land permanently. The ability of fee simple acquisition or
zoning to conserve land in perpetuity depends on whether the goals of
the government remain constant across time. If the objectives of the
government change and species protection becomes less important, the
234.

See Dennis Collins, Enforcement Problems with Successor Grantors, in PROTECTING THE

LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9 (Julie Ann Gustanski et al.

eds., 2000).
235. ED1, supra note 120 and accompanying text.
236. Recall the discussion of sending zones in section II.D.
237. Tripp & Dudek, supra note 101, at 378-79 (e.g., The Pinelands Commission).
238. Boyd, supra note 96, at 20.
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land could be reassigned to other uses or sold to fund other government
projects. 239 Fee simple acquisition and zoning are subject to lobbying by
special interest groups, which may represent a relatively small portion of
society. If the interest groups are successful in influencing the
governments' objectives, it is likely that the costs to society would outweigh the benefits to the select few that the interest group represents.2 4
The least effective mechanisms for preserving land in perpetuity
are subsidies and impact fees. Impact fees, in and of themselves, do not
restrict land to conservation but instead keep it from being developed.
Subsidies are generally paid on an annual basis and landowners have the
opportunity to forego the subsidy and develop their land without repercussion every year. Also, funding the subsidy may prove to be
problematic. If the necessary funding is not available, landowners may
revert to developing their land.
3. Biological Needs: Implement Active Habitat Management
The Endangered Species Act prohibits landowners from
undertaking activities that harm listed species either directly or
indirectly through habitat modification. 41 The ESA does not require
landowners to improve the quality of the species habitat on their land
but instead serves to conserve habitat.24 2 Unfortunately, for many species,
simply deterring productive uses of the land is not enough to ensure that
a minimum acceptable probability of survival will be met. Species
frequently require landowners to restore or create habitat or implement
active management practices. Such practices include prescribed
burnings, alien species control, reduced use of the land for grazing, or
reduced use of pesticides on the conserved land to maintain habitat
suitable for species recovery. For example, the leading threats to the
California red-legged frog are fragmentation of habitat, degradation of
water quality, and the introduction of an exotic species, the bullfrog.243
The recovery plan for the California red-legged frog calls for restoring
239. Id.
240. Miller, supra note 19, at 459-65; Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory
Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United
States, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 568-74 (1992).
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000). "The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." A
farmer that plows a field that is habitat for a listed species has harmed that species by
decreasing its probability of survival.
242.
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., TOOLS FOR PRIVATE LANDOWNERS & STATES, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/index.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (the U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Services's landowner page for incentives to induce landowners into
undertaking habitat management on their land).
243. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE CALIFORNIA RED-LEGGED FROG, at http://
endangered.fws.gov/features/rl-frog/rlfrog.html#threats (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
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habitat as well as controlling the threat posed by the
and creating
2
bullfrog. "
Another example is the Black-capped Vireo. The Black-capped
Vireo requires an open brushy area of young small trees and shrubs for
its habitat. 20 In the absence of natural fires, landowners must maintain
suitable habitat for the Black-capped Vireo through prescribed
burning.24 In a study of 305 listed species, better than 60 percent required
active habitat management or habitat restoration.
Active habitat management techniques are incorporated into an
incentive mechanism when participation is voluntary, each contractual
agreement can be negotiated independently, contracts are of short
duration, and assurances of certainty are included in the agreement.
Voluntary participation insures that the landowner is being fully
compensated for the habitat management requirements set forth in the
agreement. Negotiating contractual agreements on a case-by-case basis
allows the contract to be tailored to each individual landowner and to
each specific species. Negotiations allow greater flexibility in designing
an incentive package that satisfies both the landowner and speciesspecific needs. Shorter contracts necessitate frequent renegotiations,
which subsequently permit the provisions of the contract to be altered to
meet changing landowner and species needs. Furthermore, the regulator
can monitor the landowner's compliance to previous agreements prior to
negotiating new agreements. Assurances provide legal remedies in the
event the landowner does not fulfill the agreement. Assurances can
require the landowner to set aside funding sufficient to insure the longterm active management of habitat.
The largest obstacle to active habitat management is involuntary
participation. Involuntary participation is the current approach to
endangered species protection and does not provide landowners with
any incentives to manage the habitat on their land in the interest of the
species. In contrast, the landowner faces incentives to destroy the species
and its habitat to avoid the costs of protecting species. The second
greatest deterrent is long-term contracts because the longer the elapsed

244. Id. The recovery plan for the red-legged frog calls for the reintroduction of Redlegged frogs into its historic habitat, managing wetlands as critical habitat, and controlling
the threats to the Red-legged frog. See also eNature.com's section of Reptiles and Amphibians, at http://www.enature.com/fieldguide/showSpeciesRecNum.asp?recnum=AR0022
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
245. See TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE, THREATENED & ENDANGERED SPECIES, at http://
www.tpwd.state.tx.us/nature/endang/animals/birds/bcv.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
246. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, PROGRESS ON THE BACK FORTY 1, 11-14 (2000), at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/150-backforty.pdf (last visited Nov.
7, 2003). [hereinafter ED3].
247. Id. at 7.
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time between the present and the initiation of the management
agreement, the greater the likelihood that the landowner violates the
agreement in an attempt to increase his gains from his economic
activities. Active habitat management is costly, so landowners can
increase their economic gains by violating the agreement.
The mechanisms that have a very high potential for
implementing active habitat management are subsidies, conservation
banking, and fee simple acquisition. Subsidies are voluntary short-term
contracts, which are typically negotiated between the landowner and the
regulator. Subsidies can be tailored to a specific species and to each
individual landowner. Because subsidies are short-term contracts, the
regulator can ensure that the landowner has fulfilled the habitat
management requirements prior to renewing the subsidy.
Conservation banks are also voluntary and negotiated on a caseby-case basis. The number of credits a conservation bank earns for
"resale" depends partly upon the quality of the habitat.2 8 Conservation
bank owners are required to maintain the habitat in perpetuity. To
assure that the conservation bank owners fulfill the terms of their
contract, the banking agreement requires that financial assurances be set
aside to pay for the management of the habitat in perpetuity. 49 Financial
assurances can counter the negative effect of long-term contracts.2
Fee simple acquisition in the context of habitat conservation
involves a land purchase that places ownership and responsibility of
managing the land on the government. Implementing habitat management is straightforward and requires the appropriate government
agency be notified of the management requirements. A fee simple
acquisition results in a very high potential for active habitat management
to occur on the purchased land.
Easements, both PDR and donated, are voluntary long-term
contracts negotiated between the landowner and the regulator.
Easements are similar to subsidies in their ability to implement active
habitat management; except that, unlike subsidies, easements are longterm contracts. 2l Landowners receive payment in full at the time of
contract initiation and must satisfy the terms of the agreement in
perpetuity. Fulfillment of active habitat management required in the
contract depends on the integrity of the landowner, the landowner's
conservation value, and the regulator's monitoring and enforcement of
248. See CRA, supra note 34.
249. See supra note 141 and accompanying discussion.
250. By setting aside financial assurance sufficient to manage the conservation bank in
the event the original bank owner goes insolvent, the means to actively manage the
conserved habitat are in place.
251. Easements are typically contracted in perpetuity. See Easements, supra section II.G
for further discussion.
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the agreement. In any event, as time passes, active habitat management
is likely to diminish as the encumbered land changes ownership, the
opportunity cost of habitat management increases, or the regulator
relaxes the monitoring and enforcement of agreements.
TDRs, zoning, and impact fees all have a very low ability to
require landowners to undertake active habitat management because
they force landowners to conserve their land involuntarily. Involuntary
participation creates resentment and disincentives for landowners to
undertake activities that enhance the habitat on their land. Zoning and
impact fees both require landowners to conserve habitat without
compensation for lost productivity. Any habitat improvements undertaken by the landowner increase his out-of-pocket expenses.
Landowners do receive some compensation with a TDR
incentive mechanism. Owners of land in the sending zone sell their TDRs
to developers in the receiving zone, but the compensation is independent
of the opportunity cost of the land.n2 Improving the quality of the habitat
only increases the landowner's opportunity cost without affecting his
compensation. A landowner incurs fewer opportunity costs by not
undertaking active habitat management.
In sum, there is no simple answer as to which mechanism
dominates for biological needs-each has positives and negatives. The
answer depends on the development pressure in the area. If
development pressure is strong, as in southern California, conservation
banking works well. Banking conserves habitat prior to development,
induces bank owners to invest in habitat quality, makes development
pay for conservation, and sets aside money for perpetual bank
management (low monitoring and enforcement costs). Banking,
however, may have high administrative costs due to the application
process. If one is considering an area with little development pressure, a
PDR easement might be best. PDR allows one to target desired land. A
PDR is also less expensive than fee simple acquisition since one is only
buying the right to develop. Finally, a PDR keeps a landowner on the
land and tailors each agreement to the landowner and the species'
habitat needs. The downside is that PDR easements in perpetuity require
monitoring and enforcement forever, which could be costly, especially
with subsequent landowners.

252. See Mills, supra note 96, at 73-74. The current approach to TDRs creates a situation
where supply is perfectly inelastic-a given number of permits are allocated to the
landowners whose land has been zoned for conservation. The market price is driven by the
willingness to pay for permits, which is the developed value of the land zoned for
development.
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B. Landowner Interests
We consider three basic landowner concerns identified over the
years through reading the literature and our informal and formal
discussions with ranchers, policy makers, developers, and farmers.
While this list is not all-inclusive, many landowners have a common set
of goals-they want their participation to be voluntary, their privacy
maintained, and their stewardship toward the land recognized and
acknowledged.
1. Landowner Interests: Voluntary Participation
As we argued earlier, designing mechanisms that allow
landowners to voluntarily participate, rather than forcing landowners to
participate through some type of command and control mechanism,
alters the landowner's incentives.5 3 If the landowner is compensated for
habitat conservation, and the compensation is dependent on the quality
of the habitat, then landowners are provided with the incentive to
conserve their land and to do so without force. Zoning and TDR policies
predetermine which land is to be conserved and then force those
landowners into conserving their land. For these mechanisms, voluntary
participation is almost non-existent.2 Fee simple acquisition can also be
non-voluntary when the government uses its eminent domain to force
the landowner to sell his or her land. Fee simple acquisition can also
occur in situations in which the landowner voluntarily sells his or her
land to the government agency or other conservator.
When an impact fee policy is used, landowners who choose to
develop their land are required to pay an impact fee. A landowner does
have the choice to not pay the impact fee, but that entails an opportunity
cost of foregoing development of his or her land. Only landowners with
a conservation value in excess of the opportunity cost of foregone
development choose to conserve their land voluntarily. Regulatory
policies of subsidies, conservation banking, and PDR and donated
easements all have a very high rank as being voluntary for landowners.
Landowners that create conservation banks do so voluntarily with the
expectation of turning a profit.
Subsidy programs typically require landowners to apply for the
subsidy and to then satisfy specified criteria. The number of applications
can exceed the accepted conservation projects. If the incentives are not
sufficient for the landowner, the landowner has the choice of not
253. Command and control means the regulator tells the landowner what to do and
then uses financial and criminal penalties to control the landowner's actions.
254. Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 282-85 (1996); see also Boyd, supra note 96, at 1-5.
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applying. PDR and donated easements require landowner and
conservator to negotiate contracts, which specify the obligations and
requirements of both parties. If the contract is not satisfactory to the
landowner, the landowner can abort negotiations and not conserve
habitat on her land.
2. Landowner Interests: PrivacyMaintained
Most landowners in the United States want to preserve their
right to exclude persons from trespassing on their land. Also,
landowners want to minimize the rights of a third party from
legitimately, through contractual agreement or other arrangement,
entering their land. Policies that do not alter or split the property rights
to the land are more effective at maintaining privacy. When the property
rights remain intact, confusion over who has what rights is avoided.
Impact fees maintain the rights to privacy most effectively
because upon payment of the impact fee compliance to the policy is
satisfied for developed properties. For properties not developed,
landowners maintain the right to exclude government regulators from
entering their property. Zoning, like an impact fee policy, also maintains
a very high level of privacy. The landowner maintains all rights to the
land and can restrict access to his or her land.
Conservation banking and TDR mechanisms for conserving
habitat are highly effective at maintaining the landowner's privacy.
Although both mechanisms allow the government regulator access to the
land to monitor and enforce the contractual agreements, access is
typically specific.2s For subsidies, PDR easements, and donated
easements, the ability to maintain privacy is dependent on the negotiated
contracts or the rules of the program. Some subsidy programs require
the landowners to permit public access to their land, although the
landowner does have the ability to exclude specific individuals.'
Easements, however, severe the property rights and split them between
two parties. The landowners' ability to protect their privacy hinges on
the contractual agreement and may be low, medium, or high. 7 When the
government purchases land through fee simple acquisition, the land
becomes the property of the public.

255. See supra note 141 and accompanying discussion. Rights of access are specified in
the banking agreement or through the permit allocation of TDRs.
256. See HIP, supra note 31.
257. See the discussion on Easements, supra Section lI.G.
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3. Landowner Interests: Stewardship Recognized
Is the landowner's effort to preserve or enhance the habitat on
their land acknowledged? Recognition of past efforts to protect the land
can be an important consideration when evaluating a habitat
conservation mechanism. Acknowledgement can take many forms,
including public or financial awards, but must create an incentive for the
landowner to preserve or enhance the habitat on their land.
Conservation banking rewards bank owners for good stewardship by
increasing the number of credits that the bank owner can sell to offset
development. The bank owner enhances the property, increasing the
quality of the habitat or the number of listed species and, as a result,
increases the number of credits that can be sold, which increases the
revenue to the bank owner. Subsidies also reward stewardship, but less
effectively. The subsidy policy can prescribe that the landowner restore
or create habitat or the policy might only be a mechanism to keep the
land from being developed. Subsidy payments hinge on satisfactory
completion of the subsidy agreement.28
PDR and donated easement contracts may or may not
specifically recognize that the landowner has undertaken habitat
management. If the contract specifies the landowner has maintained the
habitat on the land in the past, it could affect the extent to which the
landowner meets his or her contractual obligations in the future. Some
NGOs, such as the Land Trust Alliance, spotlight owners of easement
encumbered land, recognizing stewardship, but this is less likely to occur
on government owned lands. Impact fees, zoning, and TDR policies do
not necessarily provide landowners with a stewardship incentive to
enhance and maintain the habitat on the land 5 9 The fee simple purchase
mechanism scores very low for the recognition criteria because the land
is in public hands, and people may see the responsibility of maintaining
the land as the government's problem.
C. Regulatory Concerns
We consider five general categories of regulatory concerns
associated with implementing an incentive scheme. These five categories

258. See the discussion on Subsidies, Section I.C. Note in particular California's Timber
Tax Credit, supra note 31 and accompanying discussion, and Washington's Salmon
Recovery Funding Board, supra note 31.
259. See Robert Innes et al., Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on
PrivateLands, 12 J. ECON. PERsp. 35 (1998); see also Boyd, supranote 96, at 20-24.
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are administrative costs, monitoring and enforcement costs, acquisition
costs, information rents, and risk of habitat destruction.2 6
1. Regulatory Concerns:Administrative Costs
Administrative costs are expenditures necessary to establish
conservation plans, process applications, establish markets to facilitate
trades between suppliers and demanders of tradable development rights
and bankable credits, process and maintain records for property right
transfers and land use restrictions, and staff and fund programs that
maintain government owned conservation lands.261 Administrative costs
increase as the needed staff, reporting requirements, and other various
accounting needs increase.
Administrative costs are lowest for the status quo-zoning.
Zoning ordinances have been used to control the shape of growth for a
century. 262 The if
infrastructure necessary to administer a zoning
conservation policy is already in place. Administrative costs for zoning
ordinances increase as the government planning agency implements
more flexible zoning policies. Two examples of flexible zoning include
cluster zoning'-dividing the land into a high density development
cluster and an open space cluster, and performance zoning ' providing
a certain level of conservation prior to approval of a development plan.
Flexible programs usually increase the administrative costs to the local
government and subject the developer to more governmental control
due to the project-by-project review process.2 Impact fees, like zoning,
have low administrative costs because the infrastructure necessary to
implement an impact fee policy is already established.2 6
Fee simple acquisitions have low to medium administrative
costs. The costs result from the need to manage and maintain land once
acquired. Government agencies responsible for managing these lands are
largely intact, and only a minimal increase in staff may be necessary.
Like fee simple acquisition, donated easements also have low to medium
260. Again our choices of criteria come from summarizing the existing literature, our
discussions with policy makers, and our experience in policy decisions.
261. See ED1, supra note 141, and accompanying discussion.
262. For the Record: Landmarks in Planning History, the Case That Put Zoning on the Map, at
http://www.planning.org/info/landmarks/record.htm. Zoning became a legally acceptable method for controlling land uses when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Village of Euclid in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
263. UCLCC, supra note 22, at 39.
264. Id.
265. Miller, supranote 19, at 462-63.
266. Impact fees are already being used in most all communities-for example,
development projects are charged an impact fee to pay for the construction of new roads
necessary to control congestion.
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administrative costs because the infrastructure necessary to oversee a
donated easement policy is already in place. A large portion of the
administrative responsibility for donated easements rests with the IRS,
which has an adequate budget to deal with the responsibility of donated
easement oversight at a minimal to zero impact on staffing requirements.
While donated easements must still be negotiated between the landowner and a conservator, the administrative costs to the regulator are
small because the conservator can be an IRS approved nonprofit
267
conservation organization.
Conservation banks are at the other end of the spectrum-high
administrative costs. Conservation banks require the regulator to staff
the oversight of an extensive application process and establish a market
for and track the transfer of bankable credits. 2" PDR easements,
subsidies, and TDRs also have high administrative costs. For PDR
easements, contract negotiations constitute the bulk of the administrative
costs. The costs of contract negotiations are high because PDR easements
result in the landowner and the regulator having joint ownership in the
property. Some agreements on how to split the property rights may
require complex and costly negotiations. Subsidies also have high to
very high administrative costs because subsidy programs typically
require the landowner to submit an application and to satisfy specific
requirements. The regulator incurs administrative costs to evaluate
applications and to insure that the specified requirements are met. And
as the application and review process becomes more extensive,
administrative costs increase. By some estimates, administrative costs for
subsidy mechanisms have been in the range of ten to 30 percent of every
dollar spent. 2 9 Finally, TDRs involve land allocated for conservation
through zoning. Here, administrative costs come from the need to
establish a market to facilitate trades and to record the transfer of TDRs.
Record keeping helps insure that, once a landowner has traded (sold)
away the development rights in the land, the land is designated for
conservation thereafter.270 One can imagine that if records are not
maintained, the landowner could perhaps lobby for future zoning
changes and, if successful, develop his land.

267. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. PUB. No. 526, supra note 194.
268. See ED1, supra note 120, at 23-26.
269. Robert Innes, The Economics of Takings and Compensation When Land and Its Public
Use Value Are in Private Lands, 76 LAND ECoN. 195, 205-12 (2000).
270. As stated above, the administration costs of zoning are low. See supra note 263 and
accompanying text.
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2. Regulatory Concerns: Monitoring and Enforcement Costs
Administrative costs arise from implementing the incentive
program. In contrast, monitoring costs are the costs that the regulator
accrues in insuring that land use restrictions are not being violated and
that contractual conservation agreements are being upheld. When
violations of land use restrictions or contractual agreements occur,
enforcement costs accrue in correcting the situation. Monitoring and
enforcement obligations are perpetual and must be funded annually.
Fee simple acquisition has low monitoring and enforcement
costs. Inherent in the purchase of the land is the right to control
acceptable land uses and the costs of monitoring and enforcement may
be limited to preventing the public from misusing the land. Conservation
banking has low to medium monitoring and enforcement costs. The costs
to monitor and enforce agreements are low because the banking
agreement stipulates reporting and monitoring criteria, establishes a
2
bank manager, and specifies remedies for violations of the agreement. 7
Conservation banks also combine many developers' mitigation
requirements, reducing the number of mitigation projects requiring
regulatory oversight. Because the sole purpose of a conservation bank is
to earn profits through the provision of conservation, bank owners are
unlikely to undertake activities that diminish their potential profits."
Higher monitoring and enforcement costs are found with
incentive mechanisms that allow the landowner to remain on the land
and retain complete or partial property rights. The magnitude of the
costs to monitor and enforce conservation requirements is related to
many factors including the time frame in which conservation payments
are made to the landowner, the length of conservation agreements, and
the landowners' range of permissible land uses. Spreading landowner
compensation payments over many periods, rather than paying the
landowner one lump sum, is likely to reduce the costs of monitoring and
enforcing agreements. The landowner must prove compliance on regular
time intervals to receive the periodic conservation payment.
Likewise, the shorter the contract duration, the lower the
monitoring and enforcement costs are likely to be. Monitoring and
enforcement costs tend to increase in relation to the lapse of time
between the present and the time of agreement initiation increases."
Furthermore, with longer contracts, the probability that the land will
transfer ownership increases. As subsequent landowners take control of
271. See ED1, supra note 120, at 23-26.
272. Linda Fernandez & Larry Karp, Restoring Wetlands through Wetlands Mitigation
Banks, 12 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 323, 323-28 (1998).
273. Boyd, supra note 96, at 20-25.
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the land, the likelihood that conservation agreements will be upheld
decreases, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements
increase.
A larger set of permissible land uses can have either a positive or
negative effect on the magnitude of monitoring and enforcement costs.
On the positive side, as the landowner's freedom to use her land
increases the need to violate the agreement decreases, thereby reducing
enforcement costs. In contrast, a higher number of acceptable land uses
provides the landowner with greater opportunity to intentionally or
unintentionally misinterpret the agreement. Whether the positive or
negative effect of landowner freedom is of more significance is uncertain.
Longer contracts that compensate landowners with a one-time
lump sum payment, such as donated and PDR easements, tend to have
larger monitoring and enforcement costs. To ensure its interests are
being fulfilled, the conservator must regularly monitor the landowner's
actions. As ownership of the PDR land changes, monitoring and enforcement costs will likely increase. Subsidies have shorter length contracts
and periodic (typically annual) payments. These factors cause subsidies
to have lower monitoring and enforcement costs, although the costs still
exceed those of conservation banking and fee simple acquisition.
Involuntary incentive mechanisms also have high monitoring
and enforcement costs, such as zoning, TDRs with zoning, and impact
fees, which force strict rules on landowners. Some restricted land uses
that require government permits, like the construction of an office
building or house, may be easily monitored. Other restricted land uses,
such as cultivating crops or clear cutting trees, may require the regulator
to engage in more active and costly monitoring and enforcement activity.
For example, a TDR with a zoning policy has high monitoring
and enforcement costs. Land restricted from development must be
monitored to ensure that landowners do not undertake prohibited
activities. Also, developers must be monitored to ensure that the density
of development does not exceed the permissible level, zoned plus TDRS.
If landowners and developers undertake prohibited activities, the
regulator must decide whether and to what degree it enforces the
restrictions, including evaluation of appropriate penalties.
The key point is that both voluntary and involuntary incentive
mechanisms allowing the landowner to stay on the land require the
regulator to incur monitoring and enforcement costs. Compensation paid
in short-term intervals is possibly the only method of reducing these
costs.

274.

See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SETTING PRIORITIES FOR LAND CONSER-

VATION (1993).
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3. Regulatory Concerns:Acquisition Costs
Acquisition costs are the actual cash outlays required to
purchase or otherwise retire land for species protection. Land can be
retired through purchase of either full or partial interest in the land or by
a payment that retires the land for a specified term.
Both fee simple acquisition and subsidies have very high costs of
retiring land for conservation purposes. The costs for fee simple
acquisition are high because acquiring land in its entirety, with all its
rights intact, is expensive and requires the greatest initial amount of
financial resources of all eight mechanisms considered here.
The acquisition costs associated with subsidies are less in the
short run. In the long run, however, subsidy acquisition costs may
exceed those of fee simple acquisition. The primary explanation for this
distinction is that subsidies generally only restrict land activities for a
limited time period.275 The annual payment of the subsidy is less than the
costs of purchasing the fee simple title. But if the land is continually
conserved through subsidies, the sum of payments over time is likely to
exceed the cost of purchasing the land outright. The increased cost for a
subsidies mechanism could be viewed as the price of flexibility.
Subsidies provide more flexibility to both the government regulator and
the landowner. At the fruition of the subsidy, both the regulator and the
landowner can reevaluate their options and determine their best course
of action for the next time period. The regulator may prefer a subsidy if
limited funds make it impossible to meet the ESA goal with other
incentive mechanisms. The landowner may prefer more flexibility if she
is uncertain about future opportunities. Regardless of who prefers more
flexibility, conserving land in perpetuity via a subsidy is likely to cost
more than using fee simple acquisition.
PDR easements require the regulator to incur acquisition costs,
but the acquisition costs of PDR easements are less than those for fee
simple acquisition because the regulator is only purchasing partial
interest in the land. PDR easement acquisition costs have been estimated
to be in the range of 20 to 90 percent of the costs of fee simple
acquisition. 276
Donated easements are funded through federal tax deductions,
which means that landowners typically receive less than the fair market
value.27 Donated easements require less actual cash outlays than do PDR
275. See the discussion on Subsidies, supra section II.C.
276. Boyd, supra note 96, at 30. The large range in easement valuations is largely due to
the uncertainty surrounding future allowed land uses. There must be a reasonable
probability that the land will be adapted to the future land use for it to affect the easement
value.
277. See the discussion on Donated Easements, supra section I.G.2
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easements. The tax deduction represents a decrease in the federal
government's annual budget, funds that must be spread across all
worthy projects. Funding a donated easement program reduces the
funds available for all federal government programs. A local regulator,
using a donated easement mechanism, can conserve land with minimal
cash outlays.
Zoning, TDRs with zoning, conservation banking, and impact
have relatively low acquisition costs. Under an impact fee
all
fees
scheme, a government funds the acquisition costs by requiring
developers to pay a fee to offset the impact of their development.
Likewise, TDRs with zoning and conservation banking involve
conservation funded by developers through the purchase of
development rights or bankable credits. Again, similar to biological
needs, no clear cut incentive scheme emerges that dominates all the
others for landowners in the general sense.
4. Regulatory Concerns:Information Rents
Information rents are costs incurred by the regulator.
Information rents occur when landowners are paid more than their
opportunity cost of the lost land simply because the landowner knows
8
more about his land than does the regulator. These costs are most
prominent when the regulator is confined to conserving specific land
parcels and required to use voluntary incentive mechanisms.
Landowners can act strategically. The landowner, knowing that the
regulator must acquire his land to satisfy the conservation objective, is
able to extract from the regulator an extra payment that exceeds his or
her actual opportunity cost. The landowner would have sold for less.
When the landowner earns information rents, society pays too much for
its conservation. The incentive mechanism can be perceived as
9
inequitable from society's point of view.2
For zoning, impact fees, conservation banking, and TDRs with
zoning, information rents are very low or nonexistent. Information rents
are absent for zoning and impact fees because landowners are not
compensated for conserving land. With the latter two, conservation
banking and TDRs with zoning, compensation is determined by the
market. A landowner's private information is reflected in the market
price and information rents are eliminated.

278. See Smith & Shogren, supra note 213. Opportunity cost is the next best alternative
foregone. In the case of land, it is the value assigned to the activity that land would be used
for in the absence of endangered species protection.
279. Id. If society is paying information rents, then society is paying a price greater than
the true value of the land.
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Of the four completely voluntary incentive mechanisms,
donated easements have the smallest potential for information rents.
Subsidies and fee simple acquisition have high to very high potential for
information rents and PDR easements have a medium to high potential
for information rents. The ability of landowners to earn information
rents is dependent on the value of the compensation paid to the
landowner and the ability of the landowner to act strategically in
negotiating for compensation. Donated easements have the lowest
compensation and the rules regulating the use of donated easements are
well defined, reducing the possibility for the landowner to act
strategically. Compensation under a PDR easement is greater than under
a donated easement. Because compensation is negotiated on a case-bycase basis, the opportunity exists for the landowner to strategically
overstate the asking price. Like PDR easements, the fee simple
acquisition incentive mechanism provides the landowner with the
opportunity to act strategically. Fee simple acquisition is unlike PDR
easements in that full interest rather than partial interest in the land is
being purchased. Landowners receive greater compensation. Because
compensation is greater and the opportunity for strategic behavior is
equal, information rents are greater for fee simple acquisition.
With a subsidy incentive mechanism, unlike the other three
voluntary mechanisms, contracts and payments are negotiated on a
regular basis. The opportunity for strategic behavior is present for
subsidies just as it is for PDR easements and fee simple acquisition. If
subsidies are negotiated annually, the landowner has the opportunity to
earn information rents every year.' The accumulation of information
rents over time could be substantial and, in present value, may exceed
the information rents of fee simple acquisition.
5. Regulatory Concerns: Risk of HabitatDestruction
When involuntary incentive mechanisms are used, government
regulations impose uncompensated out-of-pocket expenses onto
landowners. The quality of land available for conservation could be
affected if the landowner perceives that the probability of being
regulated increases with land quality, which is a likely scenario.
Zoning has high economic deadweight losses if landowners
develop their land hastily to escape the high costs that a potential zoning

280.

Id.; see also Rodney B.W. Smith & Jason F. Shogren, Protecting Species on Private

Land, in PROTECrING ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES: BIOLOGICAL NEEDS,

POLITICAL REALITIES, EcONOMIc CHOICES 326-30 (Jason F. Shogren & John Tschirhart eds.,
2001).
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rule would impose. 281 Development that supersedes zoning on
environmentally rich land can create a loss of conservation benefits.
Landowners that are subject to TDRs with zoning may also face the
incentive to prematurely develop their land. Because landowners zoned
for conservation under a TDR with zoning incentive scheme are, at the
least, partially compensated (the payment received from selling the
TDRs may not fully compensate the landowners for the lost opportunity
cost of their land), the incentive to destroy land is less than that for
zoning alone. The landowner destruction associated with impact fees
depends on if the magnitude of the impact fee is set on the habitat
quality of the land. If the impact fee is set in conjunction with the
conservation value, landowners have an incentive to destroy habitat to
2
escape expensive impact fees. For voluntary incentive mechanisms,
landowners are fully compensated and the incentive to destroy habitat is
low to very low.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude by highlighting what we have learned from our
review of the economic principles underlying the set of eight incentive
mechanisms. First, market instrumentsm that have been praised for the
ability to control air pollution at minimum costs are not as effective for
protecting habitat for two reasons. No uniform system of measuring
biodiversity exists; land has heterogeneous habitat quality and, as a
result, market systems have to be combined with other regulatory tools
like zoning to be effective. In addition, development results in
permanent destruction of habitat, giving the regulator only one chance to
get it right. Zoning would be effective on its own if political objectives,
economic circumstances, and environmental preferences never changed,
which is highly unlikely.
Second, voluntary mechanisms, like fee simple acquisition,
easements, conservation banking, and subsidies, are an effective and
flexible method for targeting low cost land with high quality habitat.
Extracting a landowner's private information, however, regarding both
habitat quality and his appreciation for the land use value is expensive
and politically charged.
Third, the incentive mechanisms of conservation banking,
subsidies, and easements can be designed to induce landowners to both
conserve their land and to invest in the conservation value of their land.
281. Recall that economic deadweight loss implies money lost due to inefficient rules
and regulations imposed on an economic system.
282. Innes, supra note 269.
283. For example, TDRs and impact fees.
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This is important when habitat needs exceed the quantity of quality
habitat and when degraded habitat must be restored to meet the ESA
objectives. It also matters when creating or restoring a habitat corridor
can expand habitat fragments.
Fourth, conservation approaches, like conservation banking and
TDRs, can be designed to satisfy both state and federal land use
regulations. There are many players involved in various habitat
conservation efforts, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(administering the ESA), the Army Corps of Engineers (administering
portions of the CWA), state fish and wildlife agencies, and other affected
state, local, and federal entities. 2" Bringing these entities together can
reduce the regulatory burden placed on both landowners and affected
agencies. The landowner receives regulatory certainty from such
cooperative relationships. The regulator can also benefit from interaction
among the players. Examples of regulator benefits are more access for
monitoring land use restrictions and well-defined recourse in the event
the landowner fails to meet stipulations in their agreements.
Sixth, mechanisms such as donated easements can reduce a
regulator's outlays by creating incentives for land trusts and other
nonprofit organizations to work together and share the costs of
conservation. Cost sharing works in both directions. Land trusts can
reduce their costs by purchasing fee simple title, placing a conservation
easement on the land they then hold, and donating the land to the
government to manage.
A final observation is that, in light of our evaluations, none of
the incentive mechanisms manage to outshine all the others. Factors such
as development pressure, funding, the range of land quality, quantity of
suitable habitat, the range of land values, and types of landowners
should be considered in determining which mechanism(s) would meet
the regulator's objectives most efficiently.
When markets have many buyers and sellers such that the
developmental pressure in the region is strong, conservation banking is
the preferred mechanism for species protection. Conservation banking
consolidates the conservation requirements of many landowners and
places the requirements in the hands of one individual or organization,
284. See COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 227. In designing multiple species conservation plans in California, representatives from all affected agencies are invited into the
designing process. The representatives in the County of San Diego Multiple Species
Conservation Program are the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the California Dep't of Fish
and Game, and the County of San Diego.
285. Id.; see County of San Diego Multiple Species Conservation Program, Implementing
Agreement by and between United States Fish and Wildlife Service, California Department of Fish
and Game, County of San Diego, 37-40 (Mar. 17, 1998), available at www.co.san-diego.ca.
us/cnty (last visited Nov. 7, 2003); see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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whose sole objective is to make money by providing conservation.
Furthermore, because their profits depend on the quality of the
conserved parcel, as well as minimizing the costs of conservation,
conservation reserves will likely satisfy the biological criteria and reduce
many of the long-term government costs.
When markets have few buyers and sellers, no incentive
mechanism stands out as the clear favorite. Each mechanism has its own
strengths and weaknesses. If we assume that the government prefers a
voluntary incentive mechanism over a command and control
mechanism, then the field of potential policies is limited to easements,
fee-simple acquisition, subsidies, or a combination of these mechanisms,
which are likely to impose similar costs on the government. The
landowner requirements are similar as well. Biological criteria have one
important difference-the conservation reserve's permanency. Subsidies
are by far the least permanent, whereas easements have the potential for
the greatest permanency. The problem with easements is that there is no
guarantee-landowners may lack sufficient incentives to continue to
uphold the contract in the future. A possible remedy to this situation
would be to create a policy that combines easements (both PDR and
donated) with subsidies.
In addition, the conservator could purchase the development
rights in the land initially, and negotiate other land use restrictions.
Some of these restrictions, in particular land management and
maintenance requirements, could be tied into an annual subsidy
negotiated periodically. The easement portion would provide
permanence, while the subsidy would give the landowner and the
conservator some flexibility. The number and types of landowners that
this policy would appeal to would likely be greater than the appeal
generated by applying mechanisms independently. The potential to
create a larger preserve should increase as a result, and because
landowners are being paid an additional annual subsidy, for which they
can negotiate, the permanence of the conservation should be more
secure.
For government costs, monitoring and enforcement costs are
likely to be lower for the same reason that the conservation reserve is
likely to be more permanent. Acquisition costs are likely to increase;
however, the cost of the easement initially may decrease because of the
stream of subsidy payments that follow. Administration of the policy
would maintain a similar approach as did a subsidy policy and costs
continue to be very high. Information rents are higher because the
landowner has two pieces of private information from which to extract
rents-the personal value of the easement and the personal value of the
annual subsidy.
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Economic incentives matter for habitat conservation because
private lands are critical for successful ESA implementation. Attempts
to reauthorize the Act have focused on altering the incentives to private
landowners by creating financial incentives that shift the burden of
conserving habitat from the landowner to a government agency or a
private organization. If compensation plans are to work cost-effectively,
they should be voluntary for the private landowners and flexible enough
to accommodate a species' biological need for habitat reserves of varying
sizes. The plans should also provide incentives for the landowner to
profit from his or her private information about the land and account for
the opportunity costs of the funds used to compensate acre set-asides.
This suggests that, to succeed at protecting species at risk in a
cost-effective manner, incentive mechanisms will have to be used in
combination. Combining incentives into a cohesive strategy for species
protection can be complex depending on the conservation goal and the
desired degree of efficiency. We must ask ourselves the basic questions:
How great is the risk we face? What will the solution cost and how
effective will it be? and Could the money be better spent? Reducing the
cost of achieving species protection goals increases the demand to
achieve these goals and reduces the resistance to achieving them. Our
goal herein has been to illustrate how economic insight can help lower
the cost of doing society's business. Evaluating the range of incentive
options that exist within the context of government regulation and
stakeholder-participation processes can allow all of us to enjoy efficient
and effective species protection.

286. Michael J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, The Private-Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1, 1-2 (1997).

